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RESOLVING INTRASTATE CONFLICTS OF 
LAWS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT 
ANDREW D. BRADT

 
ABSTRACT 
Choice-of-law analysis is typically thought of as confined to the 
multistate setting. This is a mistake. To the contrary, conflicts often appear 
between statutes of a single state. Unfortunately, courts do not see these 
cases as “choice-of-law” cases. They see them only as problems of 
statutory interpretation and ignore conflicts of laws instead of resolving 
them, either by construing the conflicting statutes independently or 
applying a canon of construction. Here, I examine the benefits of 
importing choice-of-law tools—particularly the tools of governmental-
interest analysis—into the resolution of intrastate conflicts of laws. When 
two laws promulgated by the same sovereign clash, governmental-interest 
analysis is a promising approach to resolve the conflict. It is promising 
not only because it offers a path toward more rational results, but also 
because it highlights conflicts, requires courts to make explicit their policy 
preferences, and potentially prompts legislative dialogue. After suggesting 
how interest analysis might work to resolve intrastate conflicts of laws, I 
turn to a specific example of such a conflict: the Supreme Court’s decision 
last term in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, in which 
the Court held, 5–4, that the Federal Arbitration Act commanded 
enforcement of an arbitration clause that rendered the defendant’s alleged 
antitrust violations practically unenforceable. Although the Court did not 
say so, Italian Colors was a choice-of-law case. Use of choice-of-law 
methodology would have laid bare the conflict and provided a more direct 
path to its resolution. Italian Colors, therefore, provides an example of the 
opportunities available in using choice-of-law analysis to resolve 
intrastate conflicts. 
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INTRODUCTION  
“Choice is inescapable and must be explicit.” 
—Paul Freund1 
Even before the Supreme Court handed down its strikingly pro-
arbitration ruling in 2013’s American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant,
2
 many commentators saw the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision 
in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
3
 as another nail, if not the last nail, in the 
consumer-class-action coffin.
4
 Concepcion, which held that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted California’s rule invalidating most 
class-arbitration waivers in contracts of adhesion as unconscionable, 
seemed to be yet another roadblock to maintaining a class action—
particularly the paradigmatic “small claims” class action brought on behalf 
of a class of consumers who individually suffered minimal damages.
5
 
Despite the generally gloomy response to Concepcion, some courts and 
commentators have suggested that the decision does not invalidate all 
state-law rejections of class-arbitration waivers.
6
 But the Supreme Court 
may have dashed any such hopes in its decision in Italian Colors.
7
 
One reason Italian Colors broke new ground in the class-action-and-
arbitration saga is that it does not rest on preemption grounds. Concepcion 
rested on the holding that the federal statute preempts state laws that 
appear to frustrate the policy, enshrined in the FAA, in favor of enforcing 
 
 
 1. Paul A. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1210 
(1946). 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 3. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 4. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 629 (2012) (predicting that, post-Concepcion, 
“most class cases will not survive the impending tsunami of class action waivers”); Judith Resnik, 
Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and 
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) (predicting that Concepcion 
may “signify death for the legal claims of many potential plaintiffs”); Maureen A. Weston, The Death 
of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 792 (2012) (suggesting that 
legislative response may be necessary to undo the effects of Concepcion). 
 5. David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcion’s Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration 
Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1151, 1193 (2013). 
 6. See David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public 
Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217 (2013) (discussing the use of the public-policy defense under the 
Concepcion framework); Hiro N. Aragaki, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Antidiscrimination 
Theory of FAA Preemption, 4 PENN ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 39, 41 (2013). 
 7. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/6
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arbitration clauses.
8
 As a result of that strong federal policy, the FAA is 
impervious to attempts by states to frustrate its aims by protecting 
consumers from harsh arbitration clauses. Italian Colors is different. 
Unlike Concepcion, in Italian Colors the plaintiffs did not rest their 
attempt to avoid arbitration on a state-law ground. In pressing their federal 
antitrust class action, these plaintiffs argued that the FAA should not apply 
to their case because a waiver of class-wide arbitration would prevent the 
vindication of their rights under federal law.
9
 Under the circumstances, 
because the individual damages claims were so small, enforcing an 
arbitration clause requiring individual arbitration (and prohibiting class-
wide arbitration) would effectively prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing 
their claims because no lawyer would be adequately incentivized to take 
cases on an individual basis.
10
 The plaintiffs here were appealing to the 
standard “private attorney general” rationale for any small-claims class 
action—a rationale that would be stymied if the right to arbitrate as a class 
could be waived.
11
 Indeed, this is also the best argument against the 
holding in Concepcion itself, articulated straightforwardly by Justice 
Breyer in his opinion for the four dissenting justices in that case.
12
 
Italian Colors, therefore, presented a new question—is a class-
arbitration waiver enforceable even if enforcing it will frustrate 
vindication of another federal statute, when the question of federal 
preemption of state law is not in play? Put another way, will the FAA 
trump a federal statute without the added ammunition of the vindication of 
the federal policy favoring arbitration against a state’s attempt to avoid it? 
In a 5–3 decision, the Court in Italian Colors answered “yes.”13  
Per Justice Scalia, the majority accepted that the class-arbitration 
waiver in the case effectively prevented prosecution of antitrust claims 
against American Express, but held that the FAA mandated that 
conclusion.
14
 In the Court’s view, because nothing in the text of the FAA 
(or any other statute) required that the arbitration clause not be enforced, 
and because the “purpose” of the FAA is to enforce agreements to 
 
 
 8. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 9. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 10. See In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 11.  Id.; see also D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1239 (2013) (explaining the “value-generating” purpose of small-claims 
aggregation). 
 12. 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 13. 133 S. Ct. at 2307. Justice Sotomayor did not participate because she had been on the original 
panel that decided the case in the Second Circuit. 
 14. Id. at 2309–10. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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arbitrate, the FAA straightforwardly applied.
15
 As Justice Scalia put it, 
“the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the 
vindication of every claim.”16 In dissent, Justice Kagan saw the case 
differently. In her view, the FAA admits of an “effective vindication” 
exception when enforcement of an arbitration clause amounts to 
exculpation of the defendant.
17
 In her view, reading such an exception into 
the FAA is necessary to “reconcile[] the [FAA] with all the rest of federal 
law.”18 
What’s missing from both opinions, however, is the recognition that 
Italian Colors presented a choice-of-law problem. There is an apparent 
conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act and the Sherman Act under 
these circumstances because the policies underlying both statutes cannot 
be achieved at the same time. Applying the FAA in this case would 
effectively prevent enforcement of the Sherman Act, while privileging 
enforcement of the Sherman Act would necessitate invalidating the 
arbitration clause. Neither the majority nor the dissent approaches the case 
as a choice-of-law problem (although the dissent comes closer). Yet the 
pattern is familiar to choice-of-law scholars—the choice of law ultimately 
determines the outcome of the litigation. 
This is unfortunate but unsurprising. Choice of law is typically 
considered an issue only in the multistate setting, when a court must 
decide whether to depart from local law and apply the law of another 
jurisdiction connected to the dispute. And even in the multistate setting, 
the Supreme Court has been out of the choice-of-law business for 
decades,
19
 confining its involvement to instances in which a state 
egregiously violates the Constitution by applying its own law when it has 
no legitimate connection to the case.
20
 This Article questions whether 
confining the tools of choice of law to the multistate setting makes sense 
or whether choice-of-law analysis has something to offer in the purely 
intrastate setting. As a way of starting to investigate that question, this 
Article suggests what the use of one mode of conflicts analysis—the 
 
 
 15. Id. at 2312. 
 16. Id. at 2309. Justice Thomas concurred separately to note that because nothing in the text of 
the statute suggested that the waiver should not be enforced, the FAA undoubtedly applied. Id. at 
2312–13. 
 17. Id. at 2317.  
 18. Id. at 2313. 
 19. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law 
and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271, 279 (1996); Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and 
Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 442 (1982). 
 20. Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/6
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governmental-interest approach—might look like when used in the 
intrastate conflict of laws, and considers Italian Colors as an example of 
how it might work.  
One of the crucial steps forward made by modern choice-of-law 
theorists, especially Brainerd Currie, the father of interest analysis, was 
that choosing law must be dictated by the content and underlying purposes 
of the arguably conflicting laws. Only by figuring out whether the laws’ 
purposes would be vindicated by their application in a particular case 
could a court determine whether there was really a conflict or just a false 
problem.
21
 One of Currie’s central insights was that choice of law was 
really, at its root, a process of statutory interpretation and construction, 
which would reveal whether a state had a legitimate interest in its law 
applying to a specific case. In many cases this analysis would reveal that 
only one of the allegedly conflicting jurisdictions had such an interest, and 
its law should apply. Currie’s approach, called governmental-interest 
analysis, was revolutionary and offered the means of breaking free of the 
rigid and arbitrary choice-of-law rules then in force.
22
 Defenders and 
friendly critics of Currie, such as Larry Kramer, have recognized that the 
steps of Currie’s approach are not foreign to the domestic process of 
statutory interpretation.
23
 Domestic, or intrastate, cases, however, are not 
typically viewed as “choice-of-law” cases, even though courts often must 
choose between clashing statutes promulgated by a forum sovereign. 
Rather, domestic cases are typically decided by interpreting the scope of a 
single statute or applying a single tiebreaking canon of statutory 
interpretation.
24
  
 
 
 21. See Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 245, 248 (1991). 
 22. Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 
521, 539 (1983). 
 23. Kramer, supra note 21, at 252–53; see also Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of 
Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2489 nn.182–83 (1999); Joseph William Singer, 
Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 79 (1989) (arguing that “[c]onflicts cases really differ from 
domestic disputes in only two important respects: (1) they implicate the interests of a party who may 
have relied on, or who claims protection under, the conflicting norms of another state; and (2) they 
further implicate the ability of the members of that other state to govern themselves”). 
 24. Roosevelt, supra note 23, at 2489. Conflicts analysis has typically been absent from intrastate 
statutory cases, likely because the conflicts field originally grew out of the need to accommodate the 
interests of multiple sovereigns. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN 
REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS §§ 7–9 (2d ed. 1841). As 
conflicts law developed in the mid-20th century to center on problems of statutory interpretation, the 
utility of modern conflicts thinking in the intrastate case has become clearer. Because there is 
obviously only one sovereign in a purely domestic case, traditional conflicts law might at first glance 
seem out of place. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This Article contends that employing interest analysis in the intrastate 
conflict would lead to more satisfying results because interest analysis 
provides a mechanism for exposing and rationally resolving conflicts of 
laws. At this point (particularly if you have studied choice of law), one 
might reasonably ask, why look to that notorious field for guidance?
25
 And 
if you’re going to look to choice-of-law approaches for guidance, why 
would you choose interest analysis, which has been the target of serious 
criticism
26
 (and vigorous defense)?
27
 To state my priors, I am mostly 
persuaded by interest analysis even in the multistate context, though that 
debate is (and continues to be) well ventilated. In the intrastate setting 
however, many of the potential criticisms of interest analysis as too 
parochial and forum-centric do not apply. The prime benefits of interest 
analysis are that it makes explicit the potential clashes between domestic 
statutes and requires courts to make clear their reasoning process in 
choosing law, better communicating to legislatures the conflicts lurking 
among the codes, potentially triggering corrective action.
28
 Choice of law 
is one area of law in which purposive statutory interpretation remains 
pervasive. It involves a particular kind of purposive interpretation in that it 
is done by taking the potentially conflicting law into account. 
The Court’s arbitration jurisprudence, and specifically Italian Colors, 
provides an example of the opportunities lost by not using interest analysis 
in the intrastate setting. Italian Colors is a choice-of-law case in search of 
a choice-of-law methodology. Had the court properly applied interest 
analysis, it would have made clearer the arguable conflict among federal 
statutes and the failure of the text to resolve those conflicts rather than 
suggesting that there was no conflict to resolve—as both the majority and 
dissent implied. Moreover, use of the interest-analysis tool of moderate 
and restrained interpretation would have provided a pathway to holding 
that the FAA should have yielded in this case. To be sure, such an 
alternative path might not have convinced the five justices in the majority, 
 
 
 25. One could tell a joke here about conflicts scholars holding a hammer and everything looking 
like a nail. Nevertheless, William Prosser set us back generations with our colleagues outside the 
conflicts field by calling (and requiring an obligatory reference to) the subject as a “dismal swamp.” 
William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). 
 26. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 
OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1985). 
 27. Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie’s Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 9 (1989). 
 28. See Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637 (2012) (discussing the potential 
benefits of more explicit statutory interpretation for interbranch cooperation). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/6
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but establishing interest analysis as a tool for resolving domestic conflicts 
might have been a productive tool in dissent.  
It is possible that the majority’s straightforward policy judgment is that 
it is better to avoid class actions than violations of the antitrust laws. This 
judgment is arguable, but the benefit of interest analysis is that it requires 
the Court to make clear its position in resolving the conflict rather than 
hiding behind an assertion that the two statutes can peacefully coexist. 
This Article proceeds in two parts. In Part I, I will briskly describe 
interest analysis and then suggest why it may be a useful tool in purely 
domestic cases. In Part II, I will turn to Italian Colors as an example of 
opportunities missed by not assessing the case as a matter of choice of 
law. Within Part II, I will discuss the FAA jurisprudence that led to Italian 
Colors and then the case itself, which had a lengthy stay in the Second 
Circuit before ascending to the Supreme Court. After reviewing the 
majority and dissenting opinions in the case, I will show how the 
reasoning and result may have been different had interest analysis been 
properly applied. Ultimately, my hypothesis is that the importation of 
interest analysis into the purely domestic context might lead to more well-
reasoned decisions, or at least more candid statements to Congress of how 
to properly resolve conflicts of federal statutes. 
I. INTEREST ANALYSIS AND THE INTRASTATE CONFLICT 
A. The Development of Interest Analysis 
To scholars and students of choice of law, the story of the choice-of-
law revolution is familiar, so only a brief summary is necessary to set the 
stage here.
29
 Although conflicts jurisprudence is ancient, and early 
American conflicts law is rich and interesting,
30
 I’ll pick up the story in the 
early twentieth century. At that time, American conflicts law was defined 
by a set of rigid rules that mandated selection of the law of a state to 
govern multistate controversies. Such selections were based on a single 
connecting factor, such as the place of the injury or the place of the 
making of a contract, and not the content or purpose of the arguably 
conflicting laws.
31
 The system was based on the notion that parties’ rights 
 
 
 29. An excellent summary of the story may be found in Roosevelt, supra note 23. 
 30. See, e.g., ERNEST G. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947) 
(describing early development of American conflicts law from European roots). 
 31. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, General Course on Private International Law, 193 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 119, 209 (1983) (noting that “the rules [Beale] proposed were extremely rigid”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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vested at a particular moment and that the location where those rights 
vested provided the proper governing law. Such rules sought, above all 
else, uniformity of result without regard to the forum selected.
32
 
This “traditional” system reached its apogee in 1934 with the 
publication of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, spearheaded by 
Harvard Law School Professor Joseph H. Beale.
33
 But by the time the 
Restatement was published it was already under sustained attack, most 
prominently by Walter Wheeler Cook,
34
 Ernest Lorenzen,
35
 and David 
Cavers.
36
 Beyond rejecting the metaphysical underpinnings of vested 
rights, these scholars demonstrated that when courts faithfully followed 
the traditional rules, which were not always as easy to apply as they 
seemed to be, they often reached absurd and unfair results.
37
 Moreover, 
courts simply didn’t follow the rules in many cases, using “escape 
devices” to avoid results they could not abide.38 Ultimately, the traditional 
system could not achieve the uniformity it prized most.
39
 
Although the early critics of the First Restatement were exceptionally 
successful in demonstrating the shortcomings of the traditional system, 
they were less successful in providing a workable alternative. Cook’s 
“local law” theory, premised on the idea that states always apply their own 
law but sometimes borrow the content of that law from other jurisdictions, 
 
 
 32. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736, 
751 (1924).  
 33. Kay, supra note 27, at 27–28. 
 34. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(1942). Cook, one of the leaders of the legal-realism movement, is still considered the most effective 
of Beale’s critics. Brainerd Currie, voicing every academic’s worst nightmare, described Cook as 
having “discredited the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever discredit 
the intellectual product of another.” Brainerd Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 
COLUM. L. REV. 964, 966 (1958). See also David F. Cavers, Book Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 
1171 (1943) (reviewing COOK, supra) (noting Cook’s “frontal assault” on Beale’s theory). 
 35. See LORENZEN, supra note 30. 
 36. See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 
(1933). 
 37. See, e.g., Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657, 658 
(1959) (“However conscientiously such courts have ordinarily sought to apply the substantive law of 
the state where the facts took place, they have become embroiled in the chronic problems of 
characterization, and in the illusory classification of statutes of limitation, statutes of fraud, and rules 
governing burden of proof.”). 
 38. Cavers, supra note 36, at 182. 
 39. See Lorenzen, supra note 32, at 751 (“Notwithstanding the vogue that a priori theories have 
enjoyed during the last century on the continent, no approach toward uniformity has been attained. 
There is no reason, therefore, why our courts should give up their traditional way of working out the 
problems of the Conflict of Laws in favor of any a priori theory which has no support other than that 
of the person advocating the same.”). See also BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 101 (1963) (“The ideal of uniformity of result is . . . to some extent illusory.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/6
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came closest but did not create a complete process for choosing law.
40
 
Some states had begun experimenting with more flexible methods, such as 
the “center of gravity” approach, that sought to determine the state with 
the most meaningful relationship with particular controversies, but those 
approaches, too, proved unsatisfying.
41
 
By the time Brainerd Currie entered the fray in 1958, the system was in 
upheaval.
42
 During an incredibly prolific few years, Currie announced and 
continually refined his choice-of-law system, the governmental-interest 
approach.
43
 Interest analysis is intricate, as the voluminous literature it has 
inspired demonstrates.
44
 My recap here is necessarily abbreviated, but I 
emphasize the aspects of the process that lend themselves most readily to 
intrastate conflicts. In short, interest analysis posits that the right way to 
look at choice-of-law problems is by assessing the underlying purposes of 
the arguably conflicting laws, and asking which of those laws’ purposes 
would be advanced by application to the case at hand.
45
 Rather than 
blindly selecting the jurisdiction most connected with the case and 
applying its laws, the court should look at the purposes of the arguably 
conflicting laws in order to figure out whether either or both of the two 
laws ought to rationally apply to a given case.
46
 As Professor Kay 
describes it: “Currie’s major insight was that [the traditional] rules ‘create 
problems that did not exist before,’ and that they solve the false problems 
in irrational ways, by nullifying capriciously the interest of one state or 
another whose laws were said to be in conflict without analysis of their 
underlying policies.”47  
 
 
 40. COOK, supra note 34, at 21 (noting that under the local-law theory “[t]he forum thus enforces 
not a foreign right but a right created by its own law”).  
 41. Kay, supra note 22, at 536 (noting that the center of gravity approach “lacks identifiable 
content” and is “open to manipulation”). 
 42. Kay, supra note 27, at 39 (“By 1958, when Currie announced his governmental interest 
approach, he viewed the theoretical work of destroying Beale’s vested rights thesis as complete.”). 
 43. Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1637–38 
(2005) (describing Currie’s article on married-women’s contracts as “the shot heard round the world”); 
Kay, supra note 22, at 538 (describing Currie’s “extraordinary period of scholarly productivity,” 
consisting of publishing seventeen major articles in six years).  
 44. See HERMA HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, CONFLICT OF LAWS: 
CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS 149 (9th ed. 2013) (noting the “enormous literature devoted 
specifically to Brainerd Currie’s writings”).  
 45. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 110.  
 46. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 
DUKE L.J. 171, 178; Brainerd Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. 
REV. 964, 1013–14 (1958). 
 47. Kay, supra note 22, at 539. See also CURRIE, supra note 39, at 178; Symposium, Choice of 
Law: How It Ought to Be, 48 MERCER L. REV. 639, 652 (1997) (describing the “essence of the Currie 
method” thusly: “choice of law is just the ordinary process of interpretation of the various substantive 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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At the outset, it is important to note that Currie’s theory was one that 
sought to effectuate legislative purpose. Similar to his contemporaries, the 
legal-process-school thinkers, Currie believed that legislatures passed laws 
to achieve purposes.
48
 Currie saw the legislative process as being 
influenced by “pressure groups” who sought to advance their private 
interests, and he saw statutes ultimately as representing decisions by 
legislatures as to whose policy positions would be prioritized.
49
 The 
legislation ultimately enacted represented a choice of one set of policies 
over another in a particular context.
50
 For instance, in his landmark article 
about married women’s contracts, Currie posited that the Massachusetts 
legislature’s decision to allow married women to void those contracts 
“subordinated the interests of creditors to the interests of this particular, 
favored class of debtors.”51 
In choice-of-law cases, the court’s role is to accomplish the purpose of 
the legislature when appropriate. In cases where application of a state’s 
law would further that purpose, the court should apply it, except in the 
somewhat limited circumstances in which the Constitution forbids it.
52
 In 
Currie’s view, the old “jurisdiction-selecting” choice-of-law rules were 
irrational because they often mandated selecting a law which did not 
advance the purpose of any state involved in the case. To Currie, it made 
no sense for a state to choose not to apply its own law, when doing so 
would advance its social policy, in favor of applying the law of a sister 
 
 
laws in question in light of their purposes”); id. at 661 (contending that Currie’s interest analysis 
would have been more properly named “interpretation analysis”); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Book 
Reviews, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 91, 93 (1964) (reviewing CURRIE, supra note 39)). 
 48. See KAY, KRAMER & ROOSEVELT, supra note 44, at 148 (“Resort to purposive interpretation 
places Currie squarely within the ‘legal process’ school of thought that was dominant at the time he 
was writing.”); William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371, 1380 
(1997). 
 49. See CURRIE, supra note 39, at 85; Kay, supra note 27, at 42. 
 50. See CURRIE, supra note 39, at 80–85; Kay, supra note 27, at 41–43 (describing Currie’s view 
of legislatures “weighing and balancing the conflicting interests of its various constituents” and 
ultimately “the vindication of the expressed interest of one or more private groups over those of 
another”).  
 51. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 85. 
 52. Id. at 52–53. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss Currie’s deep analysis of choice 
of law and the Constitution in three papers, one written on his own, and two with Herma Hill Schreter. 
It is worth noting, however, that these articles suggest a much more robust role for Constitutional 
regulation of choice of law than the Supreme Court has adopted over the course of the last three 
decades. See Brainerd Currie & Herma Hill Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict 
of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1960); Brainerd Currie & Herma Hill Schreter, 
Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 
1323 (1960); Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and 
the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958). 
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state, when doing so would not advance any policy of that state.
53
 The crux 
of interest analysis, then, is to figure out whether applying either or both of 
the two states’ arguably conflicting laws will advance their underlying 
purposes. 
Determining whether applying a state’s law will advance its purpose is 
a two-step process. Step one is to ascertain the governmental policy 
behind a state’s law.54 That is, what is the balance struck by the state when 
it adopted a particular law?
55
 In the best of all worlds, the legislature 
would be explicit about the underlying policy of a law, but legislatures 
rarely are. If the legislature has been silent, the court must do its best to 
unearth the law’s underlying policy, even though this is a difficult task.56 
As Professor Weintraub has put it, “[i]n real cases, there is no substitute 
for determining the actual policies underlying common-law rules and 
statutes. Sources for these policies include judicial opinions, scholarly 
commentary, and legislative history.”57 At this stage, it is important to note 
that Currie recognized the criticisms of attempts to ascertain governmental 
policy. But in the face of legislative silence, he saw no alternative to 
making the effort aside from use of arbitrary choice-of-law rules, which he 
deemed worse.
58
 
Step two of the analysis is to determine whether, in light of this policy, 
the state has a governmental interest in applying its law in the specific 
case.
59
 An “interest” requires a link between the governmental policy 
 
 
 53. CURRIE, supra note 39, 52–53. 
 54. Id. at 172. Note that such a policy could be represented both by a statute passed by the 
legislature or the lack thereof.  
 55. Kay, supra note 27, at 50. 
 56. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 172. See also Kay, supra note 27, at 52 (noting that Currie 
“persevered in his belief that laws express domestic social, economic, or administrative policies, and 
that courts are capable of discovering those policies by the kind of analysis he described”).  
 57. RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 8 (6th ed. 2010); Kay, 
supra note 27, at 122 (noting that Currie “gratefully accepted such legislative history as may be 
available”); see also CURRIE, supra note 39, at 377: 
The method employed is that of statutory construction or interpretation. It involves an attempt 
to ascertain what the legislature meant, in part by reference to definitions that have been 
established in other contexts for terms employed in the statute, and in part by resort to such 
“legislative history” as may be available; beyond this, it involves an attempt to ascertain the 
legislative purpose, and to impute to the legislature an “intention” to include the marginal 
situation or not according to whether analysis indicates that inclusion would serve, or 
disserve, or be irrelevant to that purpose. 
 58. Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 762 
(1963) (noting that “those who believe that problems in the conflict of laws are appropriately treated as 
problems of statutory construction (or of the interpretation of common-law rules) are not likely to lay 
down their cause in dismay because of [the] insight into the fictive character of legislative ‘intent’”).  
 59. Kay, supra note 27, at 53–54. 
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embodied in a particular law and the facts of the specific case.
60
 As Currie 
put it, “An ‘interest’ as I use the term is the product of (a) a governmental 
policy and (b) the concurrent existence of an appropriate relationship 
between the state having the policy and the transaction, the parties, or the 
litigation.”61 Professor Kay helpfully elaborates:  
[W]hether a state has an ‘interest’ in Currie’s sense depends on 
circumstances beyond the state’s control. Three elements are 
necessary to produce an interest: first, a factual relationship must 
exist between the state and the transaction, the parties, or the 
litigation; second, the factual relationship must implicate the 
governmental policy; and third, the relationship must be an 
appropriate one.
62
  
An appropriate relationship requires the state’s interest to be legitimate 
under the Constitution.
63
 In other words, the goal of interest analysis is to 
figure out whether applying the state’s law to a particular case will 
advance the governmental policy underlying that law.
64
 At this stage, 
however, a court is not attempting to ascertain legislative intent in 
multistate cases—that is, a court is not trying to figure out whether the 
legislature intended that a statute apply to a particular case. The legislature 
will almost certainly have been silent on that score. Rather, the court is 
determining whether application of a statute to a particular case would 
advance the purpose that motivated the statute’s enactment.65  
 
 
 60. See Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis as the Preferred Approach to Choice of Law: A 
Response to Professor Brilmayer’s “Foundational Attack”, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 483, 485–87 (1985) 
(“According to Currie, it is rational to make choice of law decisions with reference to the policies 
reflected in the laws of the involved states, and the interest of each state, in light of those policies, in 
having its law applied on the point in issue in the particular case.”); Robert A. Leflar, Choice-
Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 291 (1966) (“A governmental 
interest in a choice-of-law case, in its simplest sense, is discoverable by putting together (a) the 
reasons supporting the rule of law in question . . . and (b) the state’s . . . factual contacts with a case, or 
the issue in a case, to see if they match.”). 
 61. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 621. 
 62.  Kay, supra note 27, at 54.  
 63. Id. In general, for instance, it would not be a legitimate interest for a state to enact a law for 
the purpose of discriminating against out-of-staters. 
 64. As Cavers described it, “The decisive factor in Professor Currie’s method is the finding that 
the application of a law is reasonable in the light of the circumstances of the case and the policies the 
law expresses.” DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 99 (1965). 
 65. As Kay notes, “Currie’s search for legislative purpose, in other words, was limited to the 
discovery of domestic policy,” and not “legislative purpose about a conflicts question.” Kay, supra 
note 27, at 122–23; Sedler, supra note 60, at 487. 
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B. Interest Analysis and False Conflicts 
Proper application of interest analysis may reveal that only one state’s 
governmental policy will be advanced by applying its law to a particular 
case. In other words, only one state has a governmental interest, and the 
court should apply that state’s law. In the language of interest analysis, 
that is a “false conflict,” and represents an easy case. One problem with 
the old choice-of-law system was that it created conflicts where none 
existed and then sought to resolve them through application of arbitrary 
rules.
66
 
Perhaps the most famous “false conflict” is the New York case, 
Babcock v. Jackson.
67
 In Babcock, two residents of Rochester, New York, 
were traveling by automobile in Ontario, Canada, where they suffered an 
accident in which the passenger was badly harmed. The passenger sued the 
driver in New York, and the driver defended himself under the Ontario 
“guest statute,” which held that a driver would not be liable for any 
injuries suffered by a passenger in the event of an accident.
68
 No such 
statute existed under New York law, so the defendant would be vulnerable 
to a negligence suit. Under the traditional choice-of-law rules applying the 
law of the place where the injury occurred, the trial court applied Ontario 
law and dismissed the case.
69
 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, departing from the 
traditional rule. In so holding, the court found that the policy underlying 
Ontario’s guest statute was to prevent fraudulent claims against Ontario 
drivers and insurance carriers.
70
 Because no such parties were involved in 
the litigation, Ontario therefore had no interest in its law applying. New 
York, on the other hand, did have an interest. New York’s law provided 
for recovery by passengers against drivers based on its “policy of requiring 
a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused by his 
negligence.”71 Under the circumstances, only New York had an interest in 
applying its law, and its law should therefore be applied even though the 
injury occurred in Ontario. For Currie, this was an easy case: New York 
 
 
 66. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 726 (“A conflicts problem does not arise merely because a 
statement of the facts of the case requires mention of two states. A true problem arises only when the 
laws of two or more states are in conflict, in the sense that each state has an interest in the application 
of its distinctive legal policy.”). Currie himself thought this to be the most important contribution of 
interest analysis. Currie, supra note 58, at 756. 
 67. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 
 68. Babcock v. Jackson, 230 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115–17 (App. Div. 1962).  
 69.  Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 280. 
 70.  Id. at 285. 
 71. Id. at 284. 
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had an interest in applying its law “for the benefit of the injured New York 
resident.”72 Ontario had no conceivable interest because “[t]he guest 
statute expresses a policy for the protection of defendants,” but “[t]he 
defendant here . . . is not a citizen or resident of Ontario; he is a citizen of 
a state that holds him accountable for injuries to his guests.”73  
C. True Conflicts and Apparent True Conflicts 
Currie’s observation of “false conflicts” and recognition that traditional 
choice-of-law rules often lead to the application of a disinterested state’s 
law are relatively uncontroversial today.
74
 The more controversial aspect 
of Currie’s process comes when more than one state has a governmental 
interest in applying its law. That is, “[e]ach state has a policy, expressed in 
its law, and each state has a legitimate interest, because of its relationship 
to one of the parties, in applying its law and policy to the determination of 
the case.”75 This is a true conflict. 
According to Currie, in the case of a true conflict, the forum should 
apply its own law. This view is based on two core tenets of Currie’s 
theory. First, such a true conflict is “insoluble” by a court because it 
required “weighing” the relative merits of two states’ competing policies.76 
In Currie’s view, there was no legitimate basis for deciding which of two 
validly held policies ought to yield; in his mind, this was a core legislative 
function for which the courts lacked the necessary resources.
77
 Second, as 
an agent of the state, the court ought to apply forum law when the state has 
a legitimate interest in doing so. That is, when application of forum law 
will advance the state’s governmental purpose, the court should not refuse 
to do so in order to effectuate the policy of another state.
78
  
 
 
 72. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 724. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See also Weinberg, supra note 43, at 1642 (noting the importance of the discovery of the 
false conflict); Kramer, supra note 21, at 248 (noting Currie’s insight that “the rules create false 
problems by requiring a choice in cases where there is no real conflict of interests”). The existence of 
false conflicts is relatively uncontroversial, though Professor Singer has persuasively demonstrated 
that courts are sometimes too quick to dismiss cases as false conflicts when one or the other state 
really does have a legitimate interest in its law applying. See Singer, supra note 23, at 34. 
 75. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 107–08. 
 76. Currie, Note on Methods and Objectives, supra note 46, at 176 (noting that “assessment of 
the respective values of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to 
determine which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order. This is a function which 
should not be committed to courts in a democracy. It is a function which the courts cannot perform 
effectively, for they lack the necessary resources.”). 
 77. Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An 
Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 579 (1980). 
 78. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 119. 
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Currie was notably unenthusiastic about this result. He referred to it as 
a “give-it-up” solution to the problem and recognized that it opened his 
theory to the attack that it is parochial, but he posited that this solution was 
preferable to the traditional system and its jurisdiction-selecting rules.
79
 
But at the time he initially proposed his theory, Currie believed that the 
forum-law solution was the best available. 
Several years later, however, Currie revised his thinking. Although his 
untimely death prevented him from fully elaborating his revised approach, 
he provided useful guidance in one of his last articles, The Disinterested 
Third State.
80
 There, building on observations from an earlier essay,
81
 he 
deviated from the view that the court should necessarily apply forum law 
whenever it has a legitimate interest in doing so. Instead, when faced with 
an “apparent true conflict,” courts should take into account the conflicting 
interest of the other state involved in the dispute.
82
 In the face of such a 
conflicting interest, Currie suggested that the forum state may reexamine 
its own interest “with a view to a more moderate and restrained 
interpretation both of the policy and of the circumstances in which it must 
be applied to effectuate the forum’s legitimate purpose.”83 Instead of 
considering cases as providing a binary choice, Currie espoused the view 
that cases fall along a “continuum with no clear internal boundaries.”84 In 
other words, a case may fall somewhere in between a false and true 
conflict. In intermediate cases, the court ought to consider whether “on 
reflection conflict is avoided by a moderate definition of the policy or 
interest of one state or the other.”85 If the court could not avoid the conflict 
even through restrained interpretation, then it should simply apply forum 
law to achieve the forum state governmental interest.
86
 But such cases 
should be rare. In Professor Kay’s view, however, Currie’s refinement of 
his theory represented a significant shift in his thinking by “allow[ing] a 
measure of discretion to accommodate the conflicting interests of other 
states. In doing so he significantly increased the flexibility of his 
approach.”87 
 
 
 79. Kay, supra note 27, at 66. Currie hoped that Congress would enact a solution using the Full 
Faith & Credit clause, but it was unclear what this solution would be. 
 80. Currie, supra note 58. 
 81. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 368–70. 
 82.  Currie, supra note 58, at 757. 
 83. Id. at 757. 
 84. Id. at 764. 
 85. Id. at 763. 
 86. Kay, supra note 27, at 76.  
 87. Id. at 75–76. 
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Perhaps the best way to elaborate what Currie meant by the process of 
moderate and restrained interpretation in the case of an apparent true 
conflict is to assess how it worked in the opinion Currie viewed as a 
model: Chief Justice Traynor’s decision for the California Supreme Court 
in Bernkrant v. Fowler.
88
 Bernkrant was a statute-of-frauds case. The 
plaintiffs, Nevada residents, had purchased land in Nevada from the 
defendant.
89
 The land remained encumbered by a note held by the 
defendant, which the plaintiffs paid off in monthly installments.
90
 It was 
unclear at the time of the contract whether the defendant was a resident of 
Nevada or California.
91
 Sometime later, the defendant, in need of cash, 
approached the plaintiffs about renegotiating the deal so that the plaintiffs 
would pay a large portion of their indebtedness to the defendant in 
exchange for the defendant’s promise to forgive any outstanding debt at 
the time of his death.
92
 Of course, no one wrote any of this down, and the 
defendant later died in California, having moved there at some point. After 
the defendant’s death, the plaintiffs continued making their monthly 
payments under protest and sued the estate in California (where it was 
being probated) to have that money returned and to discharge the note.
93
 
The California statute of frauds would have barred enforcement of the oral 
agreement, while Nevada law would have allowed it.
94
 There was an 
apparent conflict: apply California law and the plaintiffs lose; apply 
Nevada law and the plaintiffs win.  
Justice Traynor approached the problem using interest analysis. 
Traynor first identified the policy underlying the California statute of 
frauds: “protecting estates being probated here from false claims based on 
alleged oral contracts to make wills.”95 But Traynor then noted that the 
legislature “has not spelled out the extent to which the statute of frauds is 
to apply to a contract having substantial contacts with another state” and 
this was not a purely domestic case.
96
 Under these circumstances, it was 
important to assess the policy underlying Nevada’s law enforcing oral 
contracts: “protect[ion of] the rights of its residents who are parties 
 
 
 88. 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961). Currie thought that Traynor had “brilliantly” resolved the conflicts 
issue in that case. Kay, supra note 27, at 75. 
89. Id. at 906. 
 90. Id. at 907. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 907–08. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 908. 
 95. Id. at 909. 
 96. Id. 
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thereto.”97 The case therefore presented two competing policies: the policy 
in favor of enforcing contracts to protect the expectations of the parties 
and the policy refusing to enforce the same contracts because of the risk of 
fraud. 
Having established the policies underlying the two states’ laws, the 
next question was whether each state had an interest in applying its law to 
these facts. As Traynor recognized, although the estate was being probated 
in California, the case had significant contacts with Nevada: the plaintiffs 
were from Nevada and the contract was made and performed in Nevada. It 
was unclear, however, where the defendant resided at the time of the 
contract, although at some point he had moved to California and died 
there.
98
 Traynor concluded that on these facts both states had a legitimate 
interest in their laws applying: California had an interest in protecting 
estates being probated in California from false claims and Nevada had an 
interest in protecting the rights of Nevada residents entering into a contract 
in Nevada.
99
 The case therefore presented an apparent true conflict of 
laws. 
Under the original formulation of Currie’s method, this situation would 
call for the application of the law of the forum state, California. But such a 
result seemed untenable under the circumstances. There was no doubt that 
California could have constitutionally applied its own law, either as a 
matter of interest analysis or as a matter of traditional conflicts rules. 
Under traditional analysis, the statute of frauds might be considered as a 
matter of evidence or procedure governed by the law of the forum.
100
  
Instead of reflexively applying California law, however, Traynor 
reassessed the problem in light of the conflict and decided that Nevada law 
ought to apply, whether or not the defendant resided in Nevada or 
California at the time of the contract. If the defendant had been residing in 
Nevada at the time the contract was made, applying California law would 
make little sense—the parties would not have been operating under any 
conception that California law might apply and the defendant’s subsequent 
move to California should not serve to undermine a contract that all parties 
believed would be valid.
101
 In Traynor’s view, this would be a fairly easy 
case—closer to a false conflict than a true conflict. 
 
 
 97. Id. at 910. 
 98. Id. at 909–10 
 99. Id.  
 100. See Currie & Schreter, supra note 52 at 1326–27; see also Emery v. Burbank, 39 N.E. 1026 
(Mass. 1895) (considering statute of frauds procedural and governed by forum law). 
 101. Bernkrant, 360 P.2d at 909. 
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But the same result would be required even if the defendant had been a 
California resident at the time the contract was made. This would be a 
much harder case, because the defendant would then be just the sort of 
person California sought to protect through its statute of frauds. Moreover, 
if the defendant had been from California, the plaintiffs should have had 
some inkling that California law might apply to the contract. Traynor, 
however, came to the conclusion that, in light of the conflict, California’s 
statute did not reach the contract.
102
 First, Nevada had a strong interest in 
enforcing the contract because the plaintiffs were from Nevada, the land 
was located in Nevada, and the contract was to be performed in Nevada. 
Second, alongside the statute of frauds, California also has a policy of 
enforcing contracts according to the expectations of the parties. To be 
sure, in a domestic case, California would subordinate that policy in a case 
where the contract did not meet the requirements of the statute of frauds, 
but it was not clear whether the same result should apply in a case with 
foreign contacts. Third, even though the plaintiffs would have reason to 
consider whether California law might apply, the question of enforcing the 
contract would arise only upon the defendant’s death, and the defendant 
could move anywhere.
103
 “Unless [the plaintiffs] could rely on their own 
law, they would have to look to the laws of all of the jurisdictions to which 
[the defendant] might move regardless of where he was domiciled when 
the contract was made.”104 
Under the circumstances, Traynor concluded that “there is thus no 
conflict between the law of California and the law of Nevada.”105 By 
applying Nevada law, the court could “give effect to the common policy of 
both states to enforce lawful contracts and sustain Nevada’s interest in 
protecting its residents and their reasonable expectations growing out of a 
transaction substantially related to that state without subordinating any 
legitimate interest of this state.”106 
Currie later expressed great admiration for Traynor’s work in 
Bernkrant, calling it “brilliantly performed.”107 To begin with, the case 
 
 
 102. Id. at 910 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Currie, supra note 58, at 757 (calling Traynor’s analysis “brilliantly performed”). Professor 
Weinberg has persuasively critiqued Bernkrant, which she described as “discriminatory” against the 
Granrud estate. On this ground she viewed the departure from California law “very hard to justify.” 
See Louise Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L. REV. 595, 610 (1984). In her 
view, the opposite result in Bernkrant “would not have been unfair.” Id. at 611. She is not wrong. 
Bernkrant is certainly a close call, which Currie recognized, Currie, supra note 58, at 763, and there is 
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approached the conflicts problem through interest analysis rather than 
applying a mechanical rule, such as applying the procedural law of the 
forum or the law of the place of the making of the contract (that either rule 
could plausibly apply demonstrated the malleability of the traditional 
system). Beyond that, however, Traynor correctly employed the tool of 
moderate and restrained interpretation in deciding that California need not 
apply its statute in order to achieve its legislative purpose. Under the 
circumstances, California could achieve its subsidiary policy of enforcing 
contracts while recognizing that, in light of Nevada’s strong interest in the 
case, it need not apply its statute of frauds in this specific case. 
Moreover, Currie recognized the difficulty of Traynor’s task. Currie 
well understood the difficulties of ascertaining legislative intent—
particularly in an area where the legislature had not spoken explicitlyto the 
scope of the statute in the face of a conflict.
108
 Currie recognized that the 
court would have to make explicit its decision in the face of the apparent 
conflict, and that by doing so the court would invite the legislature to 
address the problem for future cases. In Currie’s view, the court resolved 
the conflict “in such a way as to invite legislative correction of its 
interpretation of the legislative purpose—not in such a way as to give the 
impression that the result was dictated by principles having a validity 
independent of legislative purpose.”109 In other words, Traynor’s opinion 
 
 
much to recommend Professor Weinberg’s view; at the same time, from the perspective of 
accommodating both states’ policies, Justice Traynor’s analysis holds up much better. Ultimately, 
however, I find Traynor and Currie more persuasive. Professor Weinberg contends that Traynor’s 
result is based on the conclusion that “Granrud arrived too recently” and his estate was therefore not 
entitled to the protection of the statute of frauds. Weinberg, supra, at 610. This is not so—Traynor 
holds explicitly that Nevada law would apply whether or not Granrud was a California resident at the 
time the contract was made. Bernkrant, 360 P.2d at 910. Moreover, Professor Weinberg contends that 
Traynor’s result would allow for different results for plaintiffs who could foresee the location of the 
defendant’s death versus those who could not. Weinberg, supra, at 610. This result doesn’t necessarily 
follow from Traynor’s opinion, which simply states that Nevada law would apply to any similarly 
situated plaintiff because it is entirely unpredictable where someone will die. Bernkrant, 306 P.2d at 
910. The salient issue in Bernkrant is the relative strength of California’s competing policies of 
protecting local estates and enforcing contract under the specific circumstances of this cases. As 
Traynor notes, California’s statute of frauds would undoubtedly apply to a purely local dispute, and it 
would undoubtedly not apply to a purely Nevadan dispute. Id. at 909. The operative question is the 
extent of California’s interest when the only connection to California is the location of the estate when 
the foreign law is in conflict. In that scenario, the Traynor approach properly recognizes that 
California’s policy of enforcing contracts is stronger than its policy of protecting this particular 
estate—especially when such an interpretation avoids an unnecessary conflict with a sister State. As 
Currie noted, Bernkrant is an example of statutory interpretation of two conflicting local laws in light 
of the conflict with another state—a circumstance that the California legislature undoubtedly had never 
considered. Post Bernkrant, the ball was in the legislature’s court to change the result in future cases. 
Currie, supra note 58, at 762. 
 108. Currie, supra note 58, at 762–63. 
 109. Id.  
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did not appeal to metaphysical conflicts rules or suggest that the court was 
“weighing” state interests in a way only it could accomplish. Rather, the 
court explicitly engaged in a process of statutory interpretation that the 
legislature was free to correct. 
Two things stand out from this extended review of Bernkrant. The first 
is that, in the face of a conflict, interest analysis provides for a process of 
assessing the two conflicting laws in light of the conflict. A court ought to 
reassess the conflict in light of the competing law to determine whether 
the conflict can be avoided. This is emphatically not a process of weighing 
the merits of the two competing policies, but is instead an assessment of 
whether the conflict is intractable. Such a process may include recognizing 
that a state’s policy is multifarious and that aspects of its policy may be 
served by avoiding the conflict, such as California’s policy of enforcing 
contracts in Bernkrant. Second, this process of resolving apparent true 
conflicts is premised on the notion that the court is explicit about 
highlighting the potential conflict and how it deals with it—even if in 
dealing with it, the court exposes a policy preference. This highlighting 
function is meant to communicate with the legislature frankly, and to offer 
the legislature the opportunity to prospectively overrule the court’s 
reasoning.
110
 In this way, proper use of interest analysis facilitates 
dialogue with the legislature. Other methods of conflicts analysis, based 
on metaphysical rules or notions of conflicts rules that operate 
independently of legislative intent, shut down such a dialogue.
111
 
Even despite Currie’s enthusiasm toward Justice Traynor’s approach in 
Bernkrant, there remained the problem of the true conflict that could not 
be resolved through restrained interpretation. Under these circumstances, 
Currie adhered to his “give-it-up” conclusion in the multistate setting that 
a state should apply forum law. This was due to Currie’s deep aversion to 
a court’s weighing the interests and policies of the forum state against 
those of a foreign state. Currie thought there was no way for a court to do 
such a weighing in a principled way, so application of the forum law 
would at least effectuate the admittedly legitimate interest of the forum 
state.
112
 But in the circumstances of an intrastate true conflict, the analysis 
might be a bit different. The conflict remains insoluble from an objective 
 
 
 110. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 101–02 (2014) (discussing the importance 
of the courts’ communicating to Congress glitches and problems in statutes). 
 111. Freund, supra note 1, at 1217 (“If one of the great ends of the law is the harmonizing of 
interests, a system of conflicts of laws may make a greater contribution to that end by such an 
examination of the policies of the competing laws . . . .”). 
 112. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 182–83. 
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standpoint, but the court still is faced with making a choice. Since both 
laws are “laws of the forum,” Currie’s “give-it-up” solution is no help. 
Under such circumstances, the court is forced to exercise “legislative 
discretion,” explaining the reasoning for its result under the circumstances 
and communicating to the legislature the problem. Although Currie would 
have undoubtedly preferred that such conflict-resolution be performed by 
the legislature, the court’s hand is forced, and it should be explicit about 
what it is doing.
113
 
D. Interest Analysis in Intrastate Conflicts 
One of the central insights of interest analysis is that choosing law in a 
multistate case ought to be a process of statutory interpretation, a process 
familiar to courts from run-of-the-mill domestic cases. The problem of 
choosing among conflicting laws is not limited to the multistate setting; it 
appears in the intrastate setting as well when two laws issued by the same 
sovereign clash.
114
 Multistate cases add an additional element of 
complexity because of the presence of another state with a potentially 
competing interest.
115
 But the involvement of multiple states is not a 
necessary condition for the existence of a conflict of laws. Such conflicts 
often occur between the laws promulgated by a single sovereign. But 
when resolving those conflicts, courts rarely turn to conflicts methods. 
Instead, they resort to canons of statutory interpretation, of which the 
legislature is unaware.
116
 
Interest analysis, however, adds a new element to statutory 
interpretation because it requires explicit recognition and resolution of 
conflicts between statutes. Rather than simply interpreting a single statute 
or selecting a canon of construction to resolve a potential conflict, interest 
analysis requires analysis of policies and interests in light of the 
conflict.
117
 This is especially true in the case of apparent true conflicts, 
 
 
 113. See Currie, supra note 58, at 789 (describing the need in some cases for “judicial legislation,” 
and noting his preference for it over “the pseudo-juridical mumbo jumbo that is employed to 
camouflage judicial legislation”).  
 114. Kramer, supra note 21, at 252–53; see also Roosevelt, supra note 23, at 2489. 
 115. Singer, supra note 23, at 79 (arguing that “[c]onflicts cases really differ from domestic 
disputes in only two important respects: (1) they implicate the interests of a party who may have relied 
on, or claims protection under, the conflicting norms of another state; and (2) they further implicate the 
ability of the members of that other state to govern themselves . . . .”).  
 116. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
901, 929 (2013). 
 117.  Kay, supra note 27, at 75. 
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which require reassessment of statutory scope while taking account of the 
conflicting interests.  
Although interest analysis was developed to handle multistate conflicts, 
many of the benefits of interest analysis in the multistate setting would 
also obtain in the intrastate setting. Interest analysis exposes and resolves 
conflicts based on the potential advancement of the government’s 
underlying policy in a particular case. Rather than resorting to manipulable 
and potentially obfuscating rules like the canons of statutory construction, 
interest analysis makes explicit the potential conflict and how the court 
chooses to resolve it based on interpretations of legislative policy. As in 
the multistate setting, interest analysis serves to avoid unnecessary false 
conflicts. And in the case of potential true conflicts, interest analysis offers 
the opportunity to reach results more consistent with legislative intent.
118
 
More importantly, though, use of interest analysis tools, such as moderate 
and restrained interpretation, allows courts to begin a dialogue with the 
legislature, highlighting where conflicts might exist and prompting either 
legislative endorsement or correction.
119
  
This dialogue is of a piece with similar efforts at communication 
between the federal courts and Congress in order to facilitate legislative 
correction of vague or difficult to apply statutes. As Judge Robert 
Katzmann has written, such straightforward construction of ambiguous 
statutes by the federal courts is crucial to facilitating a more cooperative 
interbranch relationship between the courts and Congress.
120
 One recent 
example of such inter-branch dialogue is the “statutory housekeeping” 
initiative pioneered by the Governance Institute, which allows courts to 
transmit difficulties with statutory text to Congress. The program has been 
quite effective in increasing communication with Congress in part because 
it makes explicit the unforeseen problems with statutory text and makes 
clear to Congress the opportunities to fix them.
121
 
Moreover, use of an explicit interest-based conflicts analysis may be a 
significant improvement over the use of canons of statutory construction 
when statutes clash. Although some conflicts scholars have been more 
sanguine about the use of canons to resolve intrastate conflicts,
122
 
 
 
 118. See id. 
 119. See Currie, supra note 58, at 789 
 120. See Katzmann, supra note 28, at 666–67; see also id. at 670 (“When courts construe statutes 
in ways that respect what legislators consider their work product, the judiciary promotes comity with 
the first branch of government.”). 
 121. See id. at 690–91.  
 122. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 289 (1990); 
Kramer, supra note 21, at 250. 
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statutory-interpretation scholars have long noted the manipulability of the 
canons.
123
 Such criticisms have not abated, at least with respect to the 
“substantive” policy-based canons.124 With respect to an intrastate conflict, 
multiple canons could lead to different conclusions in a particular case.
125
 
As one example, the canon implying a repeal of an earlier statute by a 
statute passed later in time might lead to a different result than the canon 
seeking harmony of new statutes with those already on the books.
126
 In this 
way, the canons present more than a passing resemblance to the rigid and 
contradictory rules of the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws and 
present the same characterization-based concerns of the old system.  
Even recognizing the potential benefits of a more directly conflicts-
based approach, several questions linger. Even if one agrees that conflicts 
analysis is appropriate in the intrastate setting, why use interest analysis as 
opposed to other choice-of-law approaches, particularly when interest 
analysis has been the subject of intense criticism? For one thing, territorial 
rules of choice of law are of no use since the conflict is intrastate—looking 
to a territorial connecting factor as a guide provides no help, nor do 
systems based on qualitative assessments of contacts with a state, such as 
the center of gravity, or those that reflexively apply the law of the forum. 
Moreover, modern approaches that focus on cosmopolitan policies, such 
as multistate comity, provide little help because such policies are not in 
play in the intrastate conflict.
127
 The leading approach to choice of law, the 
 
 
 123. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); Philip P. Frickey, 
Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1991 (2005) (noting that courts can create 
new canons all the time: “the notion of a static set of entrenched policy-based canons is a myth”).  
 124. FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 92 (2009) 
(noting that “the canons may not even be helpful interpretive tools in close cases”); see also id. at 101 
(noting that empirical studies demonstrate that the “canons are too often indeterminate in direction, 
making them vulnerable to easy manipulation, much like the criticism of other interpretive tools”).  
 125. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for 
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (“Federal judges regularly exercise broad discretion 
in deciding when the canons should apply, which ones to invoke in a particular setting, and how to 
reconcile them with other contextual resources such as specific legislative history, general statutory 
policy or purpose, and deference to agency determinations.”); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND 
CONGRESS 49 (1997). 
 126. See Karen Petroski, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied Repeals, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 487 (2004) (noting the conflict between these two canons in intrastate situations); WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 274–75 (2000). See also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 
(2001) (“Canons of construction need not be conclusive and are often countered, of course, by some 
maxim pointing in a different direction.”). 
 127. Cf. ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & DONALD THEODORE TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF 
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1965); Kramer, supra note 
122. Similarly, criticisms of Currie as too focused on domestic law are inapposite. See, e.g., Alfred 
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Restatement (Second), is unhelpful in the domestic conflict for the same 
reason. The Restatement does little more than provide a laundry list of 
factors to take into account when choosing law, several of which are based 
on interest analysis.
128
 The other factors are those specifically addressed to 
the multistate setting and are therefore inapplicable.
129
 Setting aside the 
general incoherence of the Restatement (Second), when one eliminates the 
multistate-based factors, one is essentially left with interest analysis.
130
 
Moreover, many of the criticisms of interest analysis do not apply to its 
use in the intrastate setting. One of the primary critiques of interest 
analysis is its supposed parochialism—that is, it is skewed toward forum 
law, and this is improper because it devalues the policies of other states 
and facilitates forum shopping.
131
 Much can be (and has been) said about 
these criticisms, but there is little need to add to that debate here.
132
 When 
both arguably conflicting laws are issued by the same sovereign, there can 
be little concern about forum-centrism. The forum, after all, will be 
applying its own law either way.  
The potent criticisms of interest analysis for our purposes really boil 
down to criticisms of a purposivist approach to statutory interpretation, 
which interest analysis embraces for better or for worse.
133
 This too is a 
debate that has been well ventilated, and I do not purport to add much 
here.
134
 It is fair to say that textualist criticisms of purposivism certainly 
 
 
Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws—A Repy to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 
463, 489 (1960) (arguing that Currie improperly prioritizes local interest over “a common, or national, 
interest which cannot realistically be ignored”).  
 128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (1971). Three of the listed factors 
are rooted in interest analysis: “(b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of other 
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue; . . . 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law.” Id. These factors were included as a 
compromise in the 1960s when it became clear that a more rules-based approach, as advocated by 
Reporter Willis Reese, would be untenable. See Kay, supra note 22, at 552–55. 
 129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (1971) (For instance, the following 
factors, applicable to a multistate case, are inapplicable to the intrastate setting: “(a) the needs of the 
interstate and international systems; . . . (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result.”).  
 130. See Kay, supra note 22, at 562 (contending that with the framers of the Restatement’s 
“attempt to mollify their critics, they have created an umbrella for traditionalist and modern theorist 
alike: a fragile shelter that may prove itself unable to survive any but the most gentle of showers”).  
 131. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
75–76 (1991). See also Douglas Laycock, Equality and the Citizens of Sister States, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 431 (1987); John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 173 (1981). 
 132. See generally Sedler, supra note 60. 
 133. Indeed, it is unavoidable that “interest analysis seeks to determine ‘legislative purpose’ in the 
sense of ascertaining the objective that the legislature was trying to accomplish by the enactment of the 
statute.” Sedler, supra note 60, at 486.  
 134. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Processes and Products, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 
472–75 (1996) (describing the debate between textualism and purposivism). 
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apply to interest analysis to the extent that interest analysis attempts to 
determine the policy underlying a statute and that interest analysis is 
willing to make use of legislative history to accomplish that goal. Such 
criticisms were not lost on Currie himself or his contemporaries.
135
  
On that score then, a defense of interest analysis necessarily includes 
all defenses of statutory interpretation methods that go beyond the text 
itself and canons of statutory construction. But as recent scholarship 
suggests, the gap between purposivism and textualism appears to be 
narrowing.
136
 Courts appear to have occupied a middle ground, in which 
they start with the text of a statute and then turn to other sources only if 
the plain meaning of the text is unclear.
137
 This seems reasonable to me, 
both as a matter of statutory construction and as a matter of conflicts 
analysis. Currie would agree that if the legislature made clear the scope of 
a statute, courts ought to follow it.
138
 As explained above, interest analysis 
is nothing if not a theory of legislative primacy. The problem is that, as in 
most multistate conflicts cases, the legislature has not defined the scope of 
 
 
 135. Currie, supra note 58, at 762; see also von Mehren, supra note 47, at 92 (noting the difficulty 
of ascertaining policies and interests, but concluding that “a court in seeking to determine and define 
the policy or interest expressed in a given rule should seek to articulate the contemporary function or 
purpose of that rule, and in this effort should have recourse to all relevant materials that are 
appropriate for judicial consideration”). Indeed, numerous contemporary critics of Currie argued that it 
was an insurmountably difficult and wholly subjective task to determine governmental policies and 
interests. See Willis L. M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 317 
(1972); Max Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 632, 663 (1962) (reviewing 
TWENTIETH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. 
YNTEMA (Kurt Nadelmann et al. eds., 1961)). 
 136. See Jonathan T. Molot, Exchange, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2006); John F. Manning, Exchange, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 70, 74–78 (2006). See also John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
1287, 1309, 1314 (2010) (noting that counter-critiques of public-choice theory refined textualist theory 
by making it “more modest but more fundamental” and that the “ferocity of the debate . . . has largely 
receded”). 
 137. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Essay Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 1559, 1559 (2010) (arguing that “judges in general do not restrict themselves, 
sometimes even within a single opinion, to following any single theory of statutory construction”); 
Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, supra note 136, at 1307 (noting that the Court “has 
apparently reached an equilibrium that greatly tempers judicial reliance on legislative history as a 
source of evidence while enhancing judicial attention to the text”); Frickey, supra note 123, at 1980 
(contending that the votes of centrist Supreme Court justices are “best explained by a balancing 
process in which text, legislative intent, purpose, and policy are all considered eclectically”); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 321 (1990). 
 138. One limit on this principle in the multistate setting is if the legislature has violated a 
constitutional limit on its power. A critical function of courts in the multistate setting is to ensure that 
the court has not transgressed those limits by legislating a legitimate interest when one would not 
otherwise exist. See Herma Hill Kay, “The Entrails of a Goat”: Reflections on Reading Lea 
Brilmayer’s Hague Lectures, 48 MERCER L. REV. 891 (1997). 
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the statute or how it should be applied when in conflict with other 
statutes.
139
 In such cases, the text of the statute only gets you so far.
140
 
Only by using conflicts analysis can the court decide which of two 
clashing statutes ought to be enforced. 
II. ITALIAN COLORS AND THE INTRASTATE CONFLICT 
Perhaps the best way to assess the possibilities of interest analysis in 
the intrastate setting is to suggest how it might change the analysis and 
correct some of the problems with analysis of an individual case. The 
Supreme Court presented such an example just last term in American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,
141
 which involved a potential 
true conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act and the Sherman Act. In 
this Part, I will describe the doctrinal developments that led to the Italian 
Colors decision and then describe the case itself. Then I will offer some 
observations about how the Court’s analysis might have benefitted from 
use of the tools of interest analysis. 
A. How We Got Here: The Federal Arbitration Act in the Supreme Court 
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1924 with very little 
controversy—indeed, in his exhaustive study of the legislative history of 
the statute, Ian MacNeil has referred to its passage as “very close to the 
rubber stamp model.”142 Agitation for the passage of the federal act came 
primarily from the American Bar Association, which had succeeded in 
getting numerous similar state arbitration acts passed over the prior 
decade.
143
 This movement for arbitration statutes sought to overturn the 
common law rules allowing for revocation of agreements to arbitrate and 
courts’ refusals to stay litigation in favor of arbitration.144 Although 
proponents of these statutes sought legislation in all fifty states, they 
deemed a federal statute necessary in order to ensure that arbitration 
 
 
 139. Currie, supra note 58, at 761–62. 
 140. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the 
Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 559 (1992) (“Formalism cannot eliminate the existence of hard 
cases, and deciding those hard cases will remain a major part of the work of the appellate judge.”). 
 141. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 142. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, 
INTERNATIONALIZATION 109 (1992). See also Horton, supra note 6, at 1249 (referring to the 
legislative history of the FAA as a “rickety skeleton”). 
 143.  MACNEIL, supra note 142, at 41. 
 144. See id. at 29. 
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agreements would be enforced in the federal courts.
145
 This is because 
federal courts, operating prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
146
 applied their own procedural law to 
arbitration agreements and, under that law, typically allowed parties to 
revoke them at any time before the arbitrator reached a decision, 
regardless of whether such an agreement was irrevocable in state court due 
to a state arbitration statute.
147
 As MacNeil and others have noted, the 
primary goal of those pushing the federal statute was to ensure that 
arbitration agreements were enforceable in federal courts as a matter of 
federal procedural and remedial law.
148
 The scope of the FAA has, 
however, become much broader than that in the intervening nine decades.  
The FAA’s crucial provisions are found in Sections 2 through 4. 
Section 2 provides that: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, 
or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
 
 
 145. Id. at 93–94. 
 146. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 147. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). Prior to Erie, federal law was in a state of confusion. 
Federal courts were of the view that the law governing arbitration agreements was procedural or 
remedial in nature and that these issues were therefore governed by the law of the forum. But at the 
same time, the federal courts were of the view that they were not required to follow state arbitration 
statutes pursuant to the Conformity Act. In any event, although the reasons are not clear, federal courts 
prior to the arbitration act’s passage applied federal common law in this area, and federal courts 
generally allowed revocation of arbitration agreements and refused to stay litigation while arbitration 
was pending. See MACNEIL, supra note 142, at 23–24, 84. For discussion of the general patchwork 
quilt of federal procedural law during the era of the Conformity Act, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–
1958, at 54 (1992). 
 148. MACNEIL, supra note 142, at 93–97. As MacNeil demonstrates, supporters of the federal 
statute consistently referred to the federal statute as procedural and designed to apply in cases where 
the federal courts had subject-matter jurisdiction. Earlier versions of the bill, in fact, had provisions to 
reduce the jurisdictional amount for diversity cases seeking to enforce arbitration agreements, and the 
Senate balked. Moreover, the supporters of the rule continued to push for state arbitration statutes and 
a uniform state arbitration act, indicating that even the bill’s proponents did not consider the federal 
statute to be applicable in the state courts. Id. at 114–117. See also Horton, supra note 6, at 1224; 
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration 
Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, 
In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 105 (2002) (arguing that supporters intended the FAA to apply in state 
court).  
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irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
149
 
Section 3 provides for a stay of litigation while a dispute covered by an 
arbitration agreement is pending.
150
 And Section 4 allows a party to an 
arbitration agreement to bring an action in federal court to compel 
arbitration.
151
 
The Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the FAA to a federal 
statutory claim in 1953 in Wilko v. Swan.
152
 Wilko involved a 
misrepresentation claim against a brokerage firm under the Securities Act 
of 1933.
153
 The question in the case was whether Section 14 of the 
Securities Act, which voids any “condition, stipulation, or provision 
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any 
provision” of the Act, barred enforcement of the arbitration clause.154 The 
Court held that it did. Justice Reed, writing for the majority, explicitly 
recognized a conflict between the FAA and the Securities Act, writing that 
“[t]wo policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this case.”155 Reed 
noted that the FAA “afforded participants in transactions subject to its 
legislative power an opportunity generally to secure prompt, economical 
and adequate solution of controversies through arbitration if the parties are 
willing to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment,” and that the 
Securities Act “protect[s] the rights of investors and has forbidden a 
waiver of any of those rights”156 Under the circumstances, the Court held 
that a contract agreeing to arbitrate a claim under the Securities Act was 
invalid on the ground that such contracts were typically the result of the 
disparity of bargaining power between the seller and the buyer that the 
Securities Act sought to protect.
157
 
In some ways, Wilko is presented as a choice-of-law case, although the 
Court did not ultimately resolve it through use of conflicts analysis. The 
 
 
 149. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 150. Id. § 3. 
 151. Id. § 4. This section intended to overrule the old rule that a court of equity would not enforce 
an agreement to arbitrate, remitting the party seeking arbitration to a breach-of-contract action in the 
courts of law. MACNEIL, supra note 142, at 20. 
 152. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). See also Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme 
Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. 
REV. 789, 831 (2002) (arguing “that Wilko was an attempt by the Court to enforce Congress’s intent 
that a securities purchaser not be forced to waive the statutory rights that the Securities Act grants”). 
 153. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428–29. 
 154. Id. at 430. 
 155. Id. at 438. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 435. 
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Court recognized that the two policies underlying the laws were in 
conflict, but held that Congress had prospectively resolved the conflict in 
favor of the Securities Act in the unwaivability provision.
158
 In other 
words, the Court avoids the conflicts analysis by reading the Securities 
Act as providing a choice-of-law rule. As a general matter, Currie might 
have approved of the result in Wilko on the ground that the Court did not 
engage in weighing interests itself but sought to effectuate the intent of the 
legislature through interpretation of statutory language—the Court relied 
not on a canon of statutory construction but instead looked to the policies 
underlying the allegedly conflicting statutes. 
The Court’s next major foray into interpretation of the FAA involved 
the question of its applicability in diversity cases. In Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,
159
 the Court held that the FAA 
applied to diversity cases involving contracts in interstate commerce.
160
 
This was so even in the face of a conflicting law of the state in which the 
district court sat that would have rejected enforcing the arbitration 
clause.
161
 The holding in Prima Paint—in a shift from the original 
understanding of those sponsoring the FAA—was based on Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce and not merely the procedure of the 
federal courts.
162
 In 1984, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme 
Court held that the FAA applied in state court and preempted state laws 
barring arbitration of certain agreements.
163
 In so doing, the Court held 
that in passing the FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring 
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum 
for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve 
by arbitration.”164 After the Court’s holding in Prima Paint that the FAA 
 
 
 158. Id. at 438. 
 159. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 160. Id. at 405.  
 161. Id. at 424–425 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black penned a strong dissent arguing, in part, 
that the FAA should not apply in diversity cases under Erie because the application of federal law 
could be outcome determinative. This was the position that Justice Frankfurter had taken in 1956 in 
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 209 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The 
majority in the case held only that the FAA does not apply to diversity cases involving intrastate 
contracts. Id. 202–03. To say that the reasoning underlying the majority’s approach in Bernhardt is 
difficult to square with Prima Paint is an understatement. See MACNEIL, supra note 142, at 138. 
 162. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 (stating that “it is clear beyond dispute that the federal 
arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of ‘control over 
interstate commerce and over admiralty’”); see also Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting that the FAA created a “body of federal substantive law”); 
MACNEIL, supra note 142, at 138. 
 163. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
 164. Id. at 10. 
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was in fact passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the holding in 
Southland that the FAA preempts conflicting state law came as no 
surprise.
165
 
During the same period, the Court also confined the Wilko holding to 
its facts.
166
 Most directly applicable to our discussion, the Court held that 
antitrust claims were arbitrable in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.
167
 Like Wilko, Mitsubishi involved a potential 
clash between the arbitration act and another federal statute—the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.
168
 In the case, the Japanese car manufacturer, Mitsubishi,
169
 
sought to enforce an arbitration clause in its distribution contract with one 
of its dealers, Soler, based in Puerto Rico.
170
 The arbitration agreement 
specified that any claims arising out of the contract would be arbitrated in 
Japan.
171
 Because the dispute dealt with whether, under the contract, Soler 
had a right to resell Mitsubishi cars to other buyers, Mitsubishi sought to 
compel arbitration.
172
 Soler counterclaimed that Mitsubishi’s practices 
amounted to a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.
173
 The First 
Circuit held that the antitrust claims were not arbitrable, relying on a 
similar holding in the Second Circuit, American Safety Equipment Corp. v. 
J. P. Maguire & Co.,
174
 which had held in 1968 that antitrust claims were 
not subject to arbitration under the FAA.
175
 
The Supreme Court reversed in a 5–3 decision authored by Justice 
Blackmun.
176
 In it, Justice Blackmun sharply departs from the reasoning 
underlying Wilko. Although the case does not formally overrule Wilko, it 
was clear from the opinion that, barring a change in the governing 
philosophy of the Court, Wilko’s days were numbered. Citing the liberal 
 
 
 165. See MACNEIL, supra note 142, at 138. 
 166. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that ADEA 
claims are arbitrable); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) 
(permitting arbitration of claims under the 1934 Exchange Act); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 
470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (requiring arbitration of pendent state-law claims); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515–18 (1974) (refusing to extend Wilko to bar arbitration of claims brought under 
the 1934 Exchange Act involving international agreements). 
 167. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 168. Id. at 616. 
 169. This was a joint venture between Mitsubishi and Chrysler, but for simplicity’s sake, I refer to 
the plaintiff as Mitsubishi as the Court does. See id. at 617. 
 170. Id. at 618–19. 
 171. Id. at 617. 
 172. Id. at 618. 
 173. Id. at 619–20. 
 174. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) 
 175. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 620–23. 
 176. Justice Powell did not participate. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 640. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2015] RESOLVING INTRASTATE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 633 
 
 
 
 
policy in favor of arbitration noted in its more recent cases and the 
purported substantive-law foundations of the FAA on which the Court 
relied in Southland, the Court held that Soler’s antitrust counterclaims 
were arbitrable.
177
 The Court stated straightforwardly that “we are well 
past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and 
of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of 
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”178 The Court saw 
no reason, then, to depart from the strong national policy in favor of 
arbitration in the case of statutory claims. Although, in accordance with 
the savings clause of the FAA, the courts should “remain attuned to well-
supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of 
fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds ‘for 
the revocation of any contract,’” it was clear from the Court’s tone that 
such exceptions would be rare.
179
 Indeed, in contrast to Wilko’s skepticism 
of arbitration, the Mitsubishi Court endorsed the parties’ decision to 
“trade[] the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for 
the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”180 Without a 
provision analogous to the provision of the Securities Act barring the 
waiver of statutory rights (on which the Wilko court relied), statutory 
claims would not be considered per se non-arbitrable.
181
 And, in particular, 
the Court did not consider antitrust claims non-arbitrable. Rejecting the 
Second Circuit’s skepticism of arbitration of antitrust claims in American 
Safety, the Court held that, absent specific allegations of the unsuitability 
of the arbitral forum, there was no reason to be skeptical about arbitration 
of antitrust claims generally.
182
 
The Court ultimately overruled Wilko in 1989 in Rodriguez de Quijas 
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.
183
 In so doing, the Court made clear 
that “[t]o the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a 
method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to 
would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong 
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving 
disputes.”184  
 
 
 177. Id. at 629.  
 178. Id. at 626–27. 
 179. Id. at 627. 
 180. Id. at 628. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 636. 
 183. 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). 
 184. Id. at 481. Four justices dissented on the ground that Congress had not seen fit to overrule 
Wilko in the 35 years since it came down, and that the Court should therefore adhere to stare decisis. 
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The next key case in the line that currently culminates in Italian Colors 
is AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.
185
 Concepcion presented another 
iteration of the FAA’s preemptive force. The case involved consumers 
who purchased mobile-phone service from AT&T.
186
 The boilerplate 
agreement provided for mandatory arbitration of claims and that any such 
claims must be brought in the parties’ “individual capacity, and not as a 
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative 
proceeding.”187 The arbitration process was rather elaborate, providing the 
arbitrator with the ability to award a full array of remedies, requiring 
AT&T to pay all costs associated with nonfrivolous claims and to pay the 
customers’ fees if they receive an award greater than AT&T’s last 
settlement offer.
188
 The plaintiffs alleged that they had been wrongly 
charged $30.22 in sales tax and sought to bring a class action against 
AT&T on behalf of other consumers who had similarly been 
overcharged.
189
 In so doing, the plaintiffs relied on California’s Discover 
Bank rule, which held that when a class-action waiver appears in a 
contract of adhesion, involves small damages, and allegedly allows a party 
with superior bargaining power to “carr[y] out a scheme to deliberately 
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money,” the waiver is unconscionable and unenforceable under California 
law.
190
 
The Supreme Court, per a 5–4 majority with Justice Scalia writing, 
held that the FAA preempted the California unconscionability rule.
191
 
Stating again that the “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that 
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms,” and 
relying on the “national policy favoring arbitration,” the Court held that 
“class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather 
than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”192 Moreover, because 
“[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation,” state 
laws like California’s, which seem to mandate such a procedure, were 
incompatible with the FAA.
193
 Although Justice Scalia makes clear in the 
 
 
Id. at 486–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 185. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 186. Id. at 1744. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1752–53. 
 189. Id. at 1744. 
 190. Id. at 1746. 
 191. Id. at 1753. 
 192. Id. at 1748–49, 1751. 
 193. Id. at 1752. 
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opinion his general opposition to class-wide arbitration, he acknowledges 
that this is not the basis for the opinion; even if the Discover Bank rule 
might be warranted for policy reasons, the FAA would still preempt it.
194
 
Moreover, the particular arbitration scheme AT&T had designed was 
unlikely to prevent satisfaction of most small claims.
195
  
So by the time of Concepcion, the Court had established the expansive 
scope of the FAA. The FAA preempted state law which inhibited the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses. And the FAA also required 
enforcement of agreements providing for arbitration of federal statutory 
claims. It was in this context that Italian Colors arrived at the Supreme 
Court. 
B. Italian Colors 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant
196
 was the first 
major post-Concepcion arbitration case to reach the Court, and it did so 
after a lengthy history in the Second Circuit. Once the case reached the 
Supreme Court, the decision confirmed many of the worst fears of those 
who loathed Concepcion;
197
 indeed, any hopes that Concepcion would be 
limited in its scope were scotched by the Italian Colors opinion.  
For our purposes, Italian Colors provides an example of the Court 
avoiding choice-of-law analysis in intrastate conflicts. In this case, the 
Court should not have dodged the conflicts problem. Indeed, unlike other 
potential federal conflicts that had come before, Italian Colors offered no 
easy way out of the conflict. The Wilko Court was able to rely on the 
provision of the Securities Act barring waiver of statutory rights,
198
 just as 
the Rodriguez court found that provision inapposite.
199
 The Mitsubishi 
Court, for its part, was able to make the argument that the use of the 
arbitral forum would not hinder enforcement of the antitrust claims in that 
case.
200
 Italian Colors offers no such similar escape—as both the majority 
and the dissent agree, it is inescapable that enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement as written will render the plaintiffs’ claims practically 
unenforceable.
201
 Moreover, unlike Concepcion, the enforcement of the 
 
 
 194. Id. at 1750–51. 
 195. Id. at 1753. 
 196. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 197. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 198. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).  
 199. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989). 
 200. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985). 
 201.  Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309–11; id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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arbitration clause at issue in Italian Colors was not based on federal 
preemption of state law.  
Italian Colors provides an opportunity for the assessment of the 
possibilities of interest analysis in the intrastate setting. That is, the case 
presents a purported conflict of two laws—the Federal Arbitration Act and 
the Sherman Act—promulgated by the same sovereign authority, the 
federal government. The case therefore presents none of the complications 
inherent in a “horizontal” multistate case or a “vertical” conflict between a 
federal and state law (as in Southland and Concepcion). Nor is Italian 
Colors a conflict of laws from different sources, such as a federal rule or 
the common law, a complication which might change the analysis.
202
 
Rather, Italian Colors represents a choice between two arguably 
conflicting statutes standing on equal footing.  
In this Part, I will begin by briefly sketching out the factual background 
and procedural history of the case. I will then summarize the Supreme 
Court’s analysis. Then I will break down the Court’s analysis, explaining 
why application of interest analysis would have made this an easier case 
and led to the opposite result. In my view, proper application of interest 
analysis leads to the conclusion that the Federal Arbitration Act should not 
apply in this litigation, meaning that the agreement should not have been 
enforced. Regardless of whether interest analysis would have led a 
majority of the Court to a different outcome, however, it would have been 
a better result for the Court to straightforwardly expose and address the 
conflict, leading perhaps, as Currie suggested, to potential legislative 
correction. 
1. Factual Background  
Italian Colors restaurant sued American Express for violations of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
203
 In essence, the case alleged that 
American Express improperly used its market power to require merchants 
to pay inflated fees in order to accept purchases using American Express 
credit cards.
204
 In brief, American Express offers both credit cards and 
charge cards.
205
 The crucial difference is that charge cards must be paid off 
at the end of a billing cycle, while credit cards may only be partially paid 
 
 
 202. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 203. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See id. 
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off, with the balance left accruing interest.
206
 Until relatively recently, 
American Express’s business focused on charge cards, which are thought 
to be used by companies and more well-heeled consumers who can afford 
to pay off their balances at the end of each billing cycle.
207
 Because their 
customers are higher-end, American Express contends that its charge cards 
are typically used for more expensive purchases—a significant reason why 
a merchant would want to accept the American Express card.
208
 Due to the 
attractiveness of accepting the American Express charge card, American 
Express was able to charge higher fees to merchants for every purchase by 
a customer using an American Express card.
209
 The plaintiffs here alleged 
that this fee—called a “merchant discount fee”—was significantly higher 
for American Express cards than other mass-market credit cards.
210
  
Recently, American Express started focusing more of its business on 
credit cards, alongside their more traditional charge-card business. The 
issue, according to plaintiffs, is that American Express required them to 
accept American Express credit cards if they wanted to also continue to 
accept American Express charge cards. The catch was that American 
Express demanded that the merchants pay the same high fees on American 
Express credit-card purchases as charge cards. It was this conduct that the 
plaintiffs contended was a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman 
Act.
211
 
The mechanism by which the plaintiffs could pursue these claims was 
the dispute that dominated the litigation that wound up in the Supreme 
Court. The standard-form contract between American Express and 
merchants contains an arbitration clause providing that either party may 
elect to arbitrate any claim “arising from or relating to this Agreement 
and/or the relationship resulting from this Agreement.”212 The contract 
also provided (in all capital letters):  
 IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH 
RESPECT TO A CLAIM, NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM IN COURT 
 
 
 206. Id. at 2308 n.1. 
 207. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 207–09.  
 210. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308. These fees are a primary reason why many merchants do 
not accept the American Express card. Hence the Visa ad campaign of the 1990s, using the tag line, 
“And they don’t take American Express. Visa, it’s everywhere you want to be.” See Stuart Elliott, Visa 
Trims Slogan to Expand Meaning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2014, at B6. 
 211. Italian Colors, 132 S. Ct. at 2308. 
 212. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 209. 
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OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM. . . . FURTHER, 
YOU WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A 
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY OR AS A MEMBER OF ANY 
CLASS OF CLAIMANTS PERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM 
SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. THE ARBITRATOR’S 
DECISION WILL BE FINAL AND BINDING.
213
  
The contract continued: 
 There shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be 
arbitrated on a class action basis or on any basis involving Claims 
brought in a purported representative capacity on behalf of the 
general public, other establishments which accept the Card (Service 
Establishments), or other persons or entities similarly situated.
214
 
Two groups of plaintiffs, one based in New York and the other based in 
California, filed suit against American Express.
215
 The New York 
plaintiffs sued in the Southern District of New York; the California 
plaintiffs sued in the Northern District of California and their case was 
transferred to New York.
216
 All plaintiffs brought tying claims
217
 under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
218
 American Express moved to compel 
arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.
219
 Citing the “strong 
policy” in favor of arbitration embodied in the FAA, the district court 
granted the motion to compel arbitration and dismissed plaintiffs’ cases, in 
the process rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that forcing arbitration would 
be the death knell of the litigation due to its costs and the class-action 
waiver.
220
 
 
 
 213. Id. (alteration in original). 
 214. Id. 
 215. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300, 305 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 216. Id. Both cases were styled as class actions and were consolidated in the Southern District of 
New York pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).  
 217. Rick-Mik Enters LLC v. Equilon Enters. LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A tying 
arrangement is a device used by a seller with market power in one product market to extend its market 
power to a distinct product market.”). 
 218. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., No. 03 CV 9592 (GBD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11742, at 
*11-12 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 2006). The New York plaintiffs added a common-law unjust enrichment 
claim under New York law, and some California plaintiffs added a claim that the collective-action 
waiver violated that state’s Unfair Competition statute. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at *18, *22 (holding that “plaintiffs’ opposition to arbitration because of the collective 
action waiver provisions, on the theory that the costs preclude vindication of individual plaintiff’s 
statutory rights, is unpersuasive”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2015] RESOLVING INTRASTATE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 639 
 
 
 
 
2. An Extended Stay in the Second Circuit 
The district court’s grant of American Express’s motion triggered the 
case’s four-year-long second act in the Second Circuit. In the first round 
before the Second Circuit, a panel of the Court comprised of Judges 
Pooler, Sack, and Sotomayor, held “that the class action waiver provision 
at issue should not be enforced because enforcement of the clause would 
effectively preclude any action seeking to vindicate the statutory rights 
asserted by the plaintiffs.”221 Observing that the class-action waiver was 
“nothing if not capaciously worded,”222 the court determined that the result 
of the waiver was that it “precludes the signatory from having any claim 
arbitrated on anything other than an individual basis.”223 
The court began by noting that the plaintiffs were not seeking to avoid 
arbitration entirely, just arbitration on an individualized basis.
224
 The court 
then recognized that requiring individual arbitration would mean no 
arbitration at all because “the class action device is the only economically 
rational alternative when a large group of individuals or entities has 
suffered an alleged wrong, but the damages due to any single individual or 
entity are too small to justify bringing an individual action.”225 Citing 
testimony that the cost for an expert to conduct a report proving the 
antitrust claims would likely exceed $1 million, the court determined that 
the plaintiffs’ “claims cannot reasonably be pursued as individual actions, 
whether in federal court or in arbitration.”226 The court did not hold that 
waivers of classwide arbitration were per se unenforceable—even in 
antitrust cases—but rather held that enforceability of such waivers must be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis.
227
  
The Supreme Court, however, vacated the Second Circuit’s decision 
and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision in Stolt-
Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.
228
 In Stolt-Nielsen, the 
Court held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to 
class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the 
party agreed to do so.”229 On remand, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its 
 
 
 221. Amex I, 554 F.3d at 304.  
 222. Id. at 306. 
 223. Id. at 307. 
 224. Id. at 310. 
 225. Id. at 312. 
 226. Id. at 319. 
 227. Id. at 321. 
 228. 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 229. Id. at 684.  
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prior holding, deciding again “as a matter of law, that the cost of plaintiffs’ 
individually arbitrating their dispute with Amex would be prohibitive, 
effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust 
laws.”230  
Following its decision, however, the Second Circuit stayed the mandate 
pending American Express’s application for Supreme Court review.231 
While the hold was in place, the Court decided Concepcion.
232
 After 
Concepcion, the parties briefed to the Second Circuit the question of 
whether Concepcion should change the result.
233
 For a third time, the 
Second Circuit held that because the class-arbitration waiver effectively 
prevented plaintiffs from pursuing their claims, the waiver was 
unenforceable.
234
 Amex III, however, had a new wrinkle, necessitated by 
the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration decisions: figuring out what the 
next step should be in the litigation. Having decided that Stolt-Nielsen 
prevented requiring American Express to submit to classwide arbitration 
and also that to bar classwide litigation of plaintiffs’ claims would 
effectively immunize the defendant, the Second Circuit held that the 
arbitration clause was unenforceable.
235
 The court’s decision thus cleared 
the way for the plaintiffs’ federal class actions. 
Following Amex III, as permitted by Second Circuit rules, a judge of 
the court requested a poll on whether the court ought to rehear the case en 
banc.
236
 A majority of judges voted against rehearing, but the vote 
spawned a set of short opinions regarding the denial.
237
 Judge Pooler again 
wrote in defense of the panel decision, this time arguing that Concepcion 
did not control the outcome because this case did not involve 
preemption.
238
 Instead, this case dealt with the question “whether the FAA 
always trumps rights created by a competing federal statute, as opposed to 
 
 
 230. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2011); see also 
id. at 198 (“[T]he only economically feasible means for enforcing [plaintiffs’] statutory rights is via a 
class action.”).  
 231.  In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., No. 06-1871, Dkt. No. 112, (2d Cir. April 11, 2011) 
(granting motion to stay the mandate). 
 232. See supra notes 185–95 and accompanying text.  
 233.  In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., No. 06-1871, Dkt. No. 118-128. 
 234. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A]s the 
class action waiver in this case precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights, we find the 
arbitration provision unenforceable.”). By the time of Amex III, Justice Sotomayor, a member of the 
original panel who had decided Amex I, had moved on to the Supreme Court. Judges Pooler and Sack 
decided both Amex II and Amex III as a two-judge panel. 
 235. Id. at 219. 
 236. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex IV), 681 F.3d 139, 139 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. (Pooler, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).  
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rights existing under a common law of unconscionability.”239 In her view, 
the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it effectively prevented 
plaintiffs from vindicating their federal rights.
240
  
Chief Judge Jacobs dissented from the denial of rehearing.
241
 In his 
view, the panel opinion was “a broad ruling that, in the hands of class 
action lawyers, can be used to challenge virtually every consumer 
arbitration agreement that contains a class-action waiver.”242 Finding the 
case-by-case analysis prescribed by the panel to be vague and unworkable, 
Chief Judge Jacobs found the panel’s decision an unwarranted evasion of 
the policy in favor of arbitration, just like California’s evasion that the 
Supreme Court rejected in Concepcion.
243
 And with that, the case finally 
found its way up to the Supreme Court. 
3. Italian Colors in the Supreme Court 
More than five years after the appeal was first argued in the Court of 
Appeals, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion reversing the 
Second Circuit in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.
244
 
Speaking for a 5–3 majority,245 Justice Scalia held that the arbitration 
clause and class-arbitration waiver were enforceable.
246
 Justice Scalia 
began by citing the text of Section 2 of the FAA: 
 A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction 
. . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.
247
 
The Court then stated, straightforwardly, “[n]o contrary congressional 
command requires us to reject the waiver of class arbitration here.”248 In 
 
 
 239. Id. at 140.  
 240. Id. at 141–42. 
 241. Id. at 142 (Jacobs, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Cabranes and 
Judge Raggi also issued short separate dissents, but their opinions are on process grounds and express 
sympathy with Chief Judge Jacobs’ reasoning. Id. at 149.  
 242. Id. at 143.  
 243. Id. at 146. 
 244. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 245. Justice Sotomayor did not participate due to her being on the original panel that decided the 
case in the Second Circuit. 
 246. Id. at 2312. 
 247. Id. at 2309 (alteration in original) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947)). 
 248. Id. 
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response to the argument that barring class arbitration or litigation would 
effectively preclude vindication of the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims, which 
the Second Circuit panel found so persuasive, the Court stated that “the 
antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the 
vindication of every claim.”249 To the contrary, neither the antitrust laws 
nor Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide any reason to 
believe that Congress intended to reject class-arbitration waivers.
250
 
Having held that no conflicting statute required rejection of the class-
arbitration waiver, the Court then turned to the question of whether a 
common law exception for “effective vindication” of federal statutory 
rights warranted rejection of the waiver.
251
 Even if such an exception were 
to exist, it would not have served to invalidate the class-arbitration waiver 
in this case.
252
 According to the Court, “the fact that [a claim] is not worth 
the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the 
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy,” a conclusion bolstered by 
the fact that the exception (supposedly) would not have applied before the 
Federal Rules provided for class actions in 1938.
253
  
The Court concluded by discussing the impact of Concepcion on its 
opinion. Importing the Court’s preemption analysis, Justice Scalia wrote 
that Concepcion “established . . . that the FAA’s command to enforce 
arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of 
low-value claims.”254 The Court added: “[t]he latter interest, we said, is 
‘unrelated’ to the FAA. . . . Accordingly, the FAA does . . . favor the 
absence of litigation when that is the consequence of a class-action waiver, 
since its ‘principal purpose’ is the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
according to their terms.”255 Acceptance of the Second Circuit’s case-by-
case assessment of whether a class-action waiver prevents vindication of 
statutory rights “would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy 
resolution that arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration in particular 
was meant to secure.”256 
Though he joined the Court’s opinion in full, Justice Thomas concurred 
separately, reiterating his view expressed in Concepcion that the text of the 
FAA permits challenges to arbitration clauses based only on infirmities 
 
 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 2310. 
 252. See id. at 2310–11.  
 253. Id. at 2311. 
 254. Id. at 2312 n.5. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 2312. 
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with the making of the contract, such as fraud or duress.
257
 Because the 
plaintiffs did not allege any such problems with the making of the 
contract, the plain language of the FAA required enforcement of the class-
action waiver.
258
 
Justice Kagan penned a forceful dissent, joined by Justices Breyer and 
Ginsburg. Characterizing the economics of pursuing an antitrust claim 
under the terms of the contract as “a fool’s errand,” Justice Kagan 
contended that the result of the Court’s holding is: “[t]he monopolist gets 
to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its 
victims of all legal recourse. And here is the nutshell version of today’s 
opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.”259 In 
Kagan’s view, the Court should have refused to enforce the class-
arbitration waiver pursuant to the “effective vindication” exception to the 
FAA.
260
 In the dissenters’ view, doing so would “reconcile[] the [FAA] 
with all the rest of federal law—and indeed, promote[] the fundamental 
purposes of the FAA itself.”261 
Justice Kagan started with an “uncontroversial proposition,” that a 
court would not enforce a contractual provision exculpating a party from 
antitrust liability.
262
 Otherwise a party with sufficient market power could 
always insulate itself from liability under the antitrust laws.
263
 Ultimately, 
though, the arbitration agreement at issue in this case had the same effect. 
In Justice Kagan’s view, the FAA applies “so long as the prospective 
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the 
arbitral forum.”264 When “arbitration agreements . . . make federal claims 
too costly to bring,” the FAA will not enforce them.265 In short, “[w]hen 
an arbitration agreement prevents the effective vindication of federal 
rights, a party may go to court.”266 
Justice Kagan argued that recognizing the “effective vindication” 
exception furthers both the purposes of the Sherman Act and the FAA. In 
her view, recognizing the exception “furthers the statute’s goals by 
ensuring that arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of dispute 
 
 
 257. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 258. Id. at 2312–13. 
 259. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 2314. 
 264. Id. at 2314 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
637 (1985)). 
 265. Id. at 2315. 
 266. Id. at 2317. 
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resolution.”267 Because enforcement of arbitration provisions when the 
arbitration is prohibitively expensive will lead to no arbitration at all, the 
effective-vindication exception actually furthers the purposes of the FAA.  
Applying the exception in this case, Justice Kagan found these facts to 
fall squarely within the effective-vindication exception. Not only is there a 
class-action waiver, but the agreement contains a confidentiality provision 
precluding any sort of cost-sharing among potential plaintiffs and a 
provision barring any shifting costs to American Express.
268
 Moreover, 
Amex refused to enter any stipulations that might ease the burden of the 
economic analysis the plaintiffs would have to undertake.
269
 The totality of 
the circumstances—not just the class-action waiver—led Justice Kagan to 
decide that the FAA did not demand enforcement of the agreement.  
Finally, the dissent answered the argument that Concepcion is 
dispositive. First, Justice Kagan noted that Concepcion relied in part on 
the fact that the arbitration procedures at issue in that case were likely to 
allow plaintiffs to vindicate their substantive rights.
270
 Second, she noted 
that Concepcion was a preemption case, while this case involved only 
potentially conflicting federal laws.
271
 Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kagan 
saw the conflicts problem:  
Our effective-vindication rule comes into play only when the FAA 
is alleged to conflict with another federal law, like the Sherman Act 
here. In that all-federal context, one law does not automatically bow 
to the other, and the effective-vindication rule serves as a way to 
reconcile any tension between them.
272
 
C. Italian Colors as a Choice-of-Law Decision 
Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent approached Italian Colors 
as a conflicts problem. There are many arguable explanations why: courts 
don’t generally resolve intrastate conflicts by using choice-of-law analysis, 
and the Supreme Court has not deployed explicit conflicts analysis in 
Federal Arbitration Act cases, in part because, until Italian Colors, the 
Court focused on preemption doctrine. But, whether or not the Court said 
so in as many words, Italian Colors was a choice-of-law case because both 
 
 
 267. Id. at 2315. 
 268.  Id. at 2316. 
 269. Id.  
 270. Id. at 2320. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id.  
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the antitrust statute and the Federal Arbitration Act’s purposes could not 
be vindicated simultaneously. As a practical matter, prioritizing one statute 
required undermining the other. By enforcing the contract’s arbitration 
clause, the plaintiffs were left unable to enforce their antitrust claims; but 
by prioritizing enforcement of antitrust claims, the Court would have to 
reject the arbitration agreement. 
In Justice Scalia’s view, there is no conflict. Both statutes operate 
simultaneously: the FAA demands enforcement of the agreement, while 
the plaintiffs may enforce their claims under the antitrust statute in an 
individual capacity. If the result is that the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims are 
not economical to pursue, then so be it. After all, lots of litigation never 
happens because the claims are not worth the time, effort, or return.
273
  
The problem with Justice Scalia’s opinion is that he ignores the 
governmental interests and policies underlying these two statutes and, 
therefore, the conflicts problem. Statutes do not operate in vacuums but in 
interaction with each other under specific circumstances. In all sorts of 
settings, the FAA and the antitrust statutes may not come into conflict. But 
in this setting, the conflict occurs because of the existence of the 
arbitration agreement. Absent the enforcement of the arbitration clause 
pursuant to the FAA, the claims would be cost-effective to pursue because 
they could be pursued as a class action.
274
 It is the conflict of laws that 
creates the problem in the case.  
Scalia’s move here is especially striking in light of the fact that the 
Court had labored greatly to avoid such reasoning in the earlier arbitration 
cases. Mitsubishi, for instance, took great pains to hold that the plaintiff’s 
claims would suffer no prejudice from enforcement of the arbitration 
clause because “we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the 
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals 
inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute 
resolution.”275 The same was true in Concepcion, in which the Court spent 
significant time demonstrating that the particular arbitration process 
 
 
 273. See id. at 2310–11. 
 274. Or, as Justice Kagan notes, the claims might be cost-effective to pursue as a matter of 
consolidated or class-wide arbitration. But the arbitration clause prohibits that approach as well. 
Justice Scalia’s statement that these claims are uneconomical to pursue is an argument bootstrapped to 
the enforceability of the arbitration clause. See id. at 2318–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 275. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985). Cf. 
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (“These cases demonstrate that even 
claims arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be arbitrated because 
‘so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in 
the arbitral forum,’ the statute serves its functions.”) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
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mandated by the contract in that case would likely satisfy plaintiffs’ 
claims.
276
 Here, however, the circumstances required the conclusion that 
enforcement of the arbitration provision would result in the claims never 
being brought. And, as the dissent recognizes, American Express’s ability 
to create those circumstances was a product of its market power over the 
plaintiffs.
277
 Justice Scalia’s attempt, therefore, to paint the case as 
avoiding a conflicts problem is unavailing. Moreover, Justice Scalia’s 
attempted harmonization of the statutes obscures the conflict between 
them, freeing him of the duty to make plain the reasons motivating his 
resolution of the conflict. 
Although the dissent comes closer to approaching the case as a 
conflicts case, its analysis misses the mark too. The dissent also attempts 
to avoid a choice-of-law issue by applying a common-law exception to the 
FAA for “effective vindication” of the plaintiffs’ rights. Doctrinally, under 
this view, there is no need for choice-of-law analysis because the statute 
admits of an exception that avoids the conflict.
278
 As a matter of result, I 
agree with the dissent’s conclusions—and the dissent’s methodology is 
preferable to the majority’s, even if its particular solution is ad hoc. And 
the reasoning I would prefer under interest analysis is not terribly different 
in substance from Justice Kagan’s. But there are two problems with 
relying on a common law exception here. First, as the dueling opinions 
here amply demonstrate, reliance on the exception requires a mostly 
ancillary fight over whether the exception exists and what the scope of it 
ought to be.
279
 Second, positing the existence of the exception at least 
minimizes and at most obscures the existence of the conflict, standing in 
the way of the sort of conflicts analysis that would make clear the basis of 
the Court’s decision and potentially provoke legislative correction. Justice 
Kagan’s assertion that there is a common-law effective-vindication 
exception built into the FAA suggests that all is well and the legislature 
 
 
 276. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (agreeing with the District 
Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs would be “better off under their arbitration agreement . . . than they 
would have been as participants in a class action, which ‘could take months, if not years, and which 
may merely yield an opportunity to submit a claim for recovery of a small percentage of a few 
dollars’”). 
 277. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“So if the arbitration clause is 
enforceable, Amex has insulated itself from antitrust liability—even if it has in fact violated the law. 
The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims 
of all legal recourse.”). 
 278. This mode of analysis hearkens back to Wilko, in which the Court found that prohibition on 
waivers of statutory rights under the Securities Act prevented the conflict. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 
U.S. 427, 435 (1953). 
 279. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11. 
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need not act to resolve potential conflicts between other federal statutes 
and the FAA.
280
 
The question then becomes: what would an application of interest 
analysis look like in this case? As described above,
281
 interest analysis 
requires a two-step process: first determining the governmental policy 
underlying both of the allegedly conflicting statutes, and then determining 
whether those policies will be animated by applying the statutes in the 
particular case. If there is an interest in applying only one of the statutes 
implicated in the analysis, the case is a “false conflict” and that statute 
should be applied. If there appears to be an interest in applying both 
statutes under the circumstances, then the case involves an apparent true 
conflict. At that point, the court ought to engage in an effort at moderate 
and restrained interpretation of the two statutes to determine whether the 
conflict is avoidable. And if the conflict is unavoidable, then the court 
must make a frank decision about which law to apply under the 
circumstances. 
The application of interest analysis to the Italian Colors scenario 
reveals that it is an apparent true conflict that can be resolved through 
moderate and restrained interpretation. To begin, it is necessary to 
consider the governmental policy underlying the Federal Arbitration Act. 
Even applying Professor MacNeil’s analysis of the originally limited 
aspirations of the FAA, the text and legislative history of the statute both 
demonstrate that it was intended to ensure that arbitration clauses are 
enforced on the same footing as other contracts and to ensure that parties 
can rely on their enforcement when they choose to resolve disputes by 
arbitration.
282
 The statute explicitly displaces common-law rules 
preventing enforcement of such agreements and provides for a stay of 
litigation in the face of arbitration and the right to compel arbitration. The 
next preliminary question is whether there is an interest in applying the 
statute in this case. That is, will the policy underlying the FAA be 
effectuated by its application in this case? At least at first glance, the 
 
 
 280. Id. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Our effective-vindication rule comes into play only when 
the FAA is alleged to conflict with another federal law, like the Sherman Act here. In that all-federal 
context, one law does not automatically bow to the other, and the effective-vindication rule serves as a 
way to reconcile any tension between them.”). 
 281. See supra Part I.A. 
 282. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (stating the FAA’s 
“purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at 
English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements 
upon the same footing as other contracts”); MACNEIL, supra note 142, at 113–14 (describing the 
legislative history). 
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answer is yes. Here, American Express is seeking to enforce an arbitration 
agreement that the parties agreed to, and the FAA’s policy seeks to protect 
those expectations. 
The next consideration is the policy underlying the Sherman Act. As 
Professor Hovenkamp has stated, “[a]ntitrust’s fundamental concern . . . is 
to remedy, within its abilities, unreasonable exercises of market power by 
dominant firms or groups of firms.”283 And as the Court has stated with 
respect to tying agreements, as alleged by the plaintiffs in Italian Colors, 
“[w]here such conditions are successfully exacted competition on the 
merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably curbed.”284 Given that 
policy, is there an interest here? The answer is yes. The plaintiffs’ 
allegations against American Express involve the paradigmatic conduct 
that the Sherman Act is intended to prevent—the use of monopoly market 
power to charge confiscatory rates and force a tying agreement.
285
 Under 
the circumstances, applying the Sherman Act would advance its 
underlying policy. Therefore, there is an interest. 
Having decided that there is a governmental interest in applying both 
statutes, at least on the first read, Currie’s process now calls for 
reconsideration of those interests in light of the conflict to decide whether 
a moderate or restrained interpretation of one of the statutes is called for in 
order to avoid the conflict.
286
 Alternatively, if there is a true conflict, the 
court is forced into a situation in which it must choose among the 
conflicting laws. Under the circumstances here, the court is forced to go 
down one of those routes because, as discussed above, application of one 
statute will frustrate the purpose of the other.  
Before engaging in the process of reconsidering the conflict though, it 
is worth considering whether, in the intrastate context, there is a 
 
 
 283. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 93 
(2005). As Professor Hovenkamp has written, although the “much of the legislative history [of the 
Sherman Act] is useless,” the “protection of small business . . . was probably the most faithful to 
Congress’s goals in passing the Sherman Act.” Id. at 39, 41. 
 284. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). 
 285. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992) 
(stating that a tying “agreement violates § 1 of the Sherman Act if the seller has ‘appreciable economic 
power’ in the tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in 
the tied market”); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984) (noting that such 
market power exists when it can “force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a 
competitive market”). See also Christopher R. Leslie, Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements and 
Antitrust’s Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1773, 1783 (1999) (“[T]ying 
arrangements imposed by a single seller are condemned because of concern that such restraints 
suppress competition for the tied product, facilitate price discrimination, and can be used to evade 
price regulations.”).  
 274.  See supra Part I.C. 
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significant difference between judicially legislating a resolution to a true 
conflict or moderate and restrained interpretation to avoid a true conflict. 
Many of the reasons for seeking to avoid true conflicts in the multistate 
setting—in particular, those seeking to avoid interstate friction287—
disappear in the intrastate setting. As a result, the impulse to avoid the 
conflict is weaker. Moreover, the benefits of interest analysis will be 
achieved by taking either course because the Court will be engaged in an 
explicit analysis of how the statutes interact when they are in conflict. It is 
this explicit analysis that invites legislative correction—whether in the 
multistate setting, as Currie envisioned, or in the domestic setting.
288
 
Use of moderate and restrained interpretation, however, remains useful 
in the domestic setting, but not because it will avoid conflicts. Indeed, 
recognizing the conflict is useful in itself. Rather, the tools of moderate 
and restrained interpretation are useful in resolving the conflict. For 
instance, in Bernkrant, the paradigmatic example of moderate and 
restrained interpretation, Justice Traynor recognized that, along with the 
primary conflicting policies underlying two clashing statutes, there may 
also be consistent underlying secondary policies which counseled 
application of one law at the expense of the other.
289
 Recognition of these 
possibilities, even in the face of the conflict, might lead the way to the best 
possible resolution of the case while also serving the purpose of alerting 
the legislature to a need for future guidance. In Bernkrant itself, for 
instance, Traynor identified in California’s contract law both the fraud-
preventing policy of the statute of frauds but also the more general policy 
of enforcing agreements.
290
 In light of the conflict, and under the 
circumstances, Traynor took the position that the statute of frauds would 
take a backseat to California’s more general policy of enforcing 
agreements.
291
 
In the Italian Colors case, one can imagine how this approach might 
work. On the face of the problem, the conflict is apparent—enforcing one 
statute sacrifices the purposes of the other. But reinterpretation in light of 
the conflict would lead to different analysis. As per usual in the conflicts 
setting, the legislature has not spoken as to how to resolve the conflict.
292
 
 
 
 287. See CURRIE, supra note 39, at 182–83. 
 288. Currie, supra note 58, at 759. 
 289.  Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906, 909 (1961). 
 290. Id. at 910. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Currie, supra note 58, at 761–62 (“[E]veryone knows that the legislature never thought about 
the factual configuration presented by the case at bar, the judges of necessity must inquire what the 
legislature would have desired had it thought about the problem . . . .”). 
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Both statutes, however, present an underlying policy of enforcing the 
substantive law. Even in its most expansive applications of the FAA, 
however, the Supreme Court has cited the procedural and practical 
benefits of arbitration in resolving disputes.
293
 There is little reason to 
believe that there is an interest in applying the FAA in a case where its 
application will frustrate even the testing (much less the vindication) of the 
plaintiffs’ claims, as Justice Kagan noted. This is especially true in a 
context where the existence of the arbitration agreement is the result of the 
sort of concentration of market power the plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims 
exist to prevent. In light of the conflict, the interest in enforcing this 
particular arbitration clause appears to be much more attenuated. Under 
these circumstances, the conflict is resolvable in favor of rejecting the 
arbitration clause. And instead of relying on a common-law exception to 
the FAA, the Court would be relying on an explicit resolution of the 
conflict between the FAA and a substantive statute under particular 
circumstances.
294
 
It is possible, of course, to imagine a judge resolving the conflict in the 
opposite direction, though I find this analysis less persuasive. A judge 
might take the position that the strong national policy in favor of enforcing 
arbitration agreements wins out in this case. An argument along these lines 
would run as follows: there is a strong policy in favor of enforcing 
arbitration agreements in order to promote both party autonomy and the 
use of alternatives to litigation for resolving disputes. The parties’ 
agreement to the particular arbitration agreement represents a conclusion 
that the parties have agreed only to arbitrate claims that are cost-justified 
on an individual basis. Under these circumstances, the governmental 
interest in providing plaintiffs with a means of enforcing antitrust claims 
may seem more attenuated—the plaintiffs have arguably bargained away 
their ability to join together to arbitrate those claims and the FAA enforces 
that bargain. This analysis is less compelling because it suggests that the 
FAA was intended to enforce exculpatory agreements obtained through 
the application of excessive market power, but the argument is a colorable 
one. 
 
 
 293. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) 
(noting that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action 
in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function”). 
 294. As with an effective vindication, however, the use of interest analysis does require case-by-
case resolution of conflicts. Currie embraced this; different factual circumstances require different 
outcomes. Indeed, the blunt nature of the traditional rules often demanded outcomes that made little 
sense under the circumstances of the individual case. See CURRIE, supra note 39, at 180.  
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Both tacks, however, demonstrate that a conflict exists and encourages 
legislative response. Unlike the majority opinion and dissent in Italian 
Colors, both of which present the case as one which can be resolved 
without application of any conflicts methodology at all, the conflicts-based 
approach invites legislative correction without perpetuating the idea that 
courts can resolve the problem effectively themselves.  
As former Professor and now Chief Judge of the Second Circuit Robert 
A. Katzmann has demonstrated in his recent book, Judging Statutes, such 
dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches has proved fruitful, 
both in improving ambiguous statutes and inter-branch relations.
295
 
Although these efforts, pioneered by the Governance Institute, have 
proceeded in fits and starts, all involved have expressed enthusiasm about 
the results. My hope is that the conflicts-based method of resolving 
statutory problems will be in the spirit of such efforts, the more of which 
the better.
296
 
There may even be signs of hope in the Supreme Court. In a decision 
reached shortly before this article went to press, it did engage in a 
potentially more promising method of analysis in the recent case, Pom 
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.
297
 The case involved a Lanham Act 
claim against Coca-Cola alleging that its competing “pomegranate 
blueberry juice,” which apparently contained very little of either, was 
deceptively labeled and constituted unfair competition. Coca-Cola argued, 
and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that Pom’s claims were precluded by the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which prohibits false or misleading food 
labeling.
298
 The Court unanimously rejected this argument and employed 
analysis remarkably consistent with that suggested in this Article. The 
Court examined the purposes of the two statutes and found them 
complementary. As a result, there was no need to apply a canon of 
statutory interpretation to resolve the purported clash.
299
 Although there 
was no conflict to resolve here, hopefully the mode of analysis used in 
Pom Wonderful is a positive sign. The express consideration of the 
interacting purposes of the arguably conflicting statutes ought to be 
extended to cases like Italian Colors, where the statutes do conflict on that 
level.  
 
 
 295. See KATZMANN, supra note 110. 
 296. Id. at 96–102; see also KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 76–79. 
 297. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
 298.  Id. at 2233–34. 
 299.  Id. at 2237–39. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
652 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:603 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Italian Colors was a choice-of-law case in search of a choice-of-law 
methodology. Even though the case involved a conflict of federal statutes, 
because application of one statute would frustrate the purpose of the other 
and vice versa, neither the majority nor the dissent treated the case as a 
conflicts case. Rather, the majority saw no conflict between the statutes at 
all while the dissent recognized the conflict but avoided it through use of a 
judge-made exception. The Court’s analysis, however, is not unusual. 
Indeed, conflicts between two statutes promulgated by the same sovereign 
are not analyzed as choice-of-law cases but are instead considered 
problems of statutory interpretation. This article uses Italian Colors to 
investigate recasting such intrastate statutory conflicts as choice-of-law 
cases. In particular, I examine the use of the policy-based choice-of-law 
tools offered by governmental-interest analysis to resolve such conflicts. 
The benefits of interest analysis are that it (1) highlights the existence of 
the conflict and makes clear the court’s preferences in choosing law, and 
(2) it invites legislative correction of conflicts by making explicit both the 
clash and the court’s means of resolving it. Italian Colors provides an 
ideal vehicle to begin the conversation in assessing the opportunities 
presented by such analysis. 
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